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INTRODUCTION

The Texas trial lawyer who sets out to learn the meaning of the
1984 version of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery
should read the last rule first. ' As part of the overhaul of our discovery rules, the Supreme Court of Texas, aided by its Advisory
Committee and the State Bar Committee on Administration of Justice, has made major, perhaps revolutionary, changes in the enforcement mechanism. Specifically, the court has promulgated all new
Rule 215 styled: "Abuse of Discovery; Sanctions." If Rule 215 is
read first, the reader should have no trouble remaining alert while
digesting the other discovery rules.
The title of Rule 215 alerts the observer to the organizational
change effected by the new rule. Since the original promulgation of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, provisions for sanctions
have been enacted and amended in a continuous patchwork process. 2 Before April 1, 1984, three rules were devoted to sanctions,'
I. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215. By its 177-page order of December 5, 1983, adopting
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court of Texas promulgated rule revisions affecting virtually all areas of civil procedure. These amendments became effective April 1, 1984. The discovery rules underwent substantial reorganization and
substantive change under the order. The amendments affecting the discovery rules other

than the new sanctions rule are analyzed in the accompanying article by Justice Barrow and
Mr. Henderson. See Barrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil
ProcedureAffecting Discovery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713 (1984).

2. For example, former Rule 170, which provided sanctions for violations of the rules
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and sanction provisions appeared in at least seven other locations
throughout the discovery rules. 4 Rule 215 brings all' sanction provisions under one roof.6 This one rule clearly advises lawyers and
litigants of the cost of non-compliance with the discovery rules.7
A quick comparison will further reveal that Rule 215 is partially
patterned after its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37.8 The promulgation of Rule 215, however, effects a
change in pretrial procedure much greater than the collection of all
sanction rules in one place. The adoption of the new rule is more
than an incorporation of Federal Rule 37. Rule 215 extends beyond
prior Texas practice and beyond current federal practice. In this
provision lies the opportunity for great progress toward curing many
of the ailments that plague the administration of justice in Texas. It
governing orders for production and for an unjustified refusal to admit the genuineness of a
document or the truth of a fact, remained intact from September 1, 1941 to April 1, 1984.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 Historical Note (Vernon 1976). In 1957, former Rule 215a pertaining to
the failure to answer deposition questions was promulgated. It was amended in 1962 and in
1971 and each time its application was slightly broadened. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a Historical Note (Vernon 1976). Former Rule 215b, which made sanctions available against a deposing party for certain transgressions was enacted in 1973. Tex. R. Civ. P. 215b Historical
Note (Vernon 1976). Former Rule 169 contained two provisions whereby a party could be
deemed to have admitted the genuineness of a document or a fact matter. One of these was
present in the original 1941 rule. The other was added in 1973. Tex. R. Civ. P. 169 Historical Note (Vernon 1976). Finally, as rewritten in 1981, former Rules 167 and 168 contained
various sanction-type provisions for improper actions relating to requests for production and
interrogatories. Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(3) & 168(6), (7)(a)(3), (8) (Vernon Supp. 1983). Subdivision (8) of former Rule 168 incorporated by reference the sanctions of former Rules 170 and
215a. Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983)..
3. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170, 215a, 215b (Vernon 1976).
4. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167a(b)(l), 169 (Vernon 1976), Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(3), 168(6),
168(7)(3), 168(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
5. The statement that all discovery sanction provisions are contained in Rule 215
should be qualified. The substance of former Rule 215b providing an expense sanction
against a party who gives notice of a deposition and then fails to attend or whose witness
does not attend because of the fault of the party now appears in Rule 203. For a discussion
of Rule 203, see Barrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting Discovery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 752-53 (1984).
6. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215 comment.

7. When the Committee on Administration of Justice set about to revamp the Texas
discovery rules they had as a major goal the formulation of one rule dealing with the consequences of discovery abuse. Rule 215 is the product of that endeavor. Statement of Professor William V. Dorsaneo III of September, 1982, Reasons for General Revisions of
Discovery Rules, Agenda for the Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court of Texas
(Nov. 12-13, 1982).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
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may also enable the Texas judiciary to avoid potential pitfalls and
to promote fair and efficient civil litigation in the future.
Of course, a meaningful impact of Rule 215 depends upon its implementation by the bench and bar of Texas. With that fact in
mind, this article discusses the meaning of Rule 215 and its expected
impact on civil procedure in Texas. The overall philosophy and
purpose behind the rule are considered, and in this context, its provisions are examined in an attempt to explain the rule's probable
effect on Texas litigation. Emphasis is placed on the many changes
enacted, but retained practices are discussed when helpful.
II.

PURPOSE OF SANCTIONS UNDER RULE

215

It is axiomatic that the rule providing for discovery abuse sanctions must serve the ends of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and
especially those of the discovery rules.9 Rule 1 announces the goal
of the rules to be the just adjudication of substantive rights with
great expedition and dispatch at the least cost practicable.' 0 Modern
discovery rules, designed to serve the broad goal of Rule 1, are intended to convert the "trial of a lawsuit from a game of chance and
surprise, or 'Blind Man's Bluff,'" to an openly, orderly search for
truth."
In too many instances, however, the old game has merely been
replaced by a new one. 12 The new game is played with overbroad
requests, unreasonable delay tactics, and meaningless responses. 3
The idea of the game is often to induce settlement for nuisance
value or to make continuation of the lawsuit infeasible or impossible.' 4 The sanction power represents the trial court's only weapon
and the victimized party's only protection against these stratagems.
9. Comment, Imposition and Selection of Sanctions in Texas PretrialDiscovery Procedure,31 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 194-96 (1979).
10. TEX. R. Civ. P. 1.
11. Pearson Corp. v. Wichita Falls Boys Club Alumni Ass'n, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 684, 686
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); see West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1978).
12. See SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp.,
72 F.R.D. 110, 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Judge Porter expressed exasperation over the court
time required to arbitrate "no show and no tell discovery games." Id. at 11. As a result of
concern over widespread discovery abuse, he announced a new get tough policy regarding
discovery sanctions. See id. at 112.
13. See General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1983).
14. See SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp.,
72 F.R.D. 110, 111-12 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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In light of the demands now made on our courts, sanctions have
not been as effective as they must be to make possible the efficient
administration of justice. Sanctions will not perform that function
until a broader understanding of their purpose is developed. 15
Traditional learning teaches that the office of sanctions is to secure
compliance with the subject discovery order.' 6 In response to the
increased volume and complexity of litigation, however, federal and
Texas courts have realized that sanctions can, and must, serve more
far-reaching goals.' 7
The United States Supreme Court has declared that discovery
sanctions 8 should be employed by federal courts as a deterrent to
future abuses of discovery. In NationalHockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 1 the Supreme Court reviewed a court of appeals' reversal of an order of dismissal, which had been entered as a
sanction for failure to answer interrogatories as ordered.20 In holding that no abuse of discretion by the trial court was shown, the
Court reasoned:
[H]ere, as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spectrum of
15. In recent years, commentators have urged the utilization of sanctions to accomplish
more general and long-term goals. See Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw With the 1981
Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 465-68 (1980); Spears, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.- 1981 Changes in Pre-Trial Discovery, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 633, 651 (1981); Note, The

Emerging Deterrence Orientationin the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions,91 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1033-35 (1978). Another fact blamed for the ineffectiveness of sanctions is the reluctance of trial judges to impose them. See Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw With the 1981
Texas Rules,32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 467-68 (1980).
16. The imposition of sanctions has often been held an abuse of discretion when, although it took inordinate coercion, discovery was finally permitted. See Young Cos. v.
Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ). In Young
Cos., the trial court was held to have abused its discretion in imposing sanctions on one
defendant. See id at 902. The court of appeals reversed as to that defendant because the
defendant eventually provided discovery although it took five months to get a good faith
response to the plaintiffs interrogatories. See id at 903; see also Smith v. Wilkins, 577
S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ); Ebeling v. Gawlik, 487 S.W.2d
187, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
17. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, 642-43 (1976) (deterrent to future violations); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (2d Cir. 1979) (prevent party from
profiting from his own wrongdoing); Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 630-31 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1982, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (facilitate litigation, prevent abuse of
legal process, protect litigants, deter discovery abuse).
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
19. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
20. See id at 639.
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sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the district
court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those
who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent. If the decision of the Court of Appeals remained undisturbed in
this case, it might well be that these respondents would faithfully comply with all future discovery orders entered by the District Court in
this case. But other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we
think Rule 37 contemplates they
should feel to flout other discovery
2
orders of other district courts. '
By the above-quoted language, the Supreme Court clearly accepted
as legitimate aims of discovery sanctions the coercion of compliance, the deterrence of future violation by the derelict party, and the
deterrence of similar action by future litigants.
In Cine Forty-SecondStreet Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp.,2 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
approved the preclusion of the plaintiffs proof of damages even
though the plaintiff had belatedly complied with discovery orders.2 3
The court recognized a threefold purpose served by discovery sanctions.2 4 Preclusion orders assure that a party will not profit by his
own surreptitious action. 25 Additionally, sanctions serve as specific
deterrents to secure compliance with a particular order. 26 Finally,
courts should use sanctions for their healthy effect on the future actions of the litigants involved and on those litigants appearing
before the court in later cases.27 In Cine Forty-SecondStreet Theatre
Corp., the court considered this view essential to the judiciary's efforts to extricate itself from the pretrial quagmire threatening to engulf the litigation process.2 8
A further consideration, as well as the enlightening perspective of
a trial judge, is put forth in Riverside MemorialMausoleum, Inc. v.

21. Id at 643 (emphasis in original).
22. 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
23. See id at 1068.
24. See id at 1066.
25. See id at 1066; see also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d
1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Robison v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37, 39 (10th
Cir. 1966).
27. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d
1062, 1063-64 (2d Cir. 1979).
28. See id at 1063-64.
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Sonnenblic-Goldman Corp.29 The court in that case explains the indispensable role of the sanctions rule in enabling the trial judge to
expeditiously move his cases.3" The efficient handling of all cases is
necessary to open the judicial process to all citizens who seek adjudication of their rights. 3 '
Texas courts have met the challenge of officiating modem discovery battles by recognizing that use of the sanction power must be
directed to objectives beyond the coercion of compliance with a particular order. In Southern Pacic TransportationCo. v. Evans, 32 the
appellant contended that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering a default judgment against him because he had eventually
provided discovery.3 3 The court of appeals acknowledged the old

rule that sanctions are to be used to secure compliance with discovery rules and not to punish.34 The court further noted, however,
that widespread discovery abuse dictated a revised approach. In affirming the default judgment, the court approved the use of sanctions as a general deterrent to violation of discovery procedure.35
In Bottinelli v. Robinson, 36 the court faced an argument similar to
that in Evans. The trial court ordered a dismissal only after granting the appellant several opportunities to obey court orders and
avoid the sanction. The court of civil appeals viewed this approach
as more than mere punishment. The threat of sanctions was primarily used in this case to encourage compliance with discovery requests. 37 The execution of the sanction order was justified as a
deterrent to future violations of discovery rules and court orders.38
The court also recognized that trial courts must combat abusive dis29. 80 F.R.D. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
30. See id at 436-37.
31. See id at 1063-64; see also G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d

645, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1978).
32. 590 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
33. See id. at 518.
34. See id at 518.

35. See id at 518-19. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the United States
Supreme Court case of NationalHockey League. See id (citing National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976)).
36. 594 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
37. Seeid. at 118.
38. See id. at 118-19. The court quoted NationalHockey Leaguein support of its hold-

ing that sanctions should be used for their prophylactic effect. See id (citing National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976)).
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covery practices so that other litigants may have access to the courts
for the prompt settlement of disputes.39 The court concluded that
the trial judge had used his discretion properly to achieve these
goals.4 °
The development of this multiple-purpose approach to the imposition of discovery sanctions was advanced by the 1981 amendments
to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 ' In Waguespack v. Halipolo, 42 the 1981 rule changes were seen as providing the tools "to
facilitate the litigation of lawsuits" and "to prevent abuse of the legal process" .4 The court of appeals explained that these new tools
were meant to deter discovery abuse and to protect litigants from
excessive burden and expense. 44
In recent years, a new concept of the office of sanctions has clearly
emerged in answer to new challenges facing the Texas judicial system. Through decisions and rule changes, our courts have recognized that discovery sanctions must do more than just obtain
compliance of the recalcitrant party.45 The most important of the
newly-embraced purposes is deterrence of future violations.46
Moreover, courts have held that sanctions are properly used to ensure that the abuser does not profit by his wrong, and that his adver39. See id. at 118; see also G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 647
(9th Cir. 1978).
40. In contrast, the court in Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co. held that the trial court
abused its discretion by rendering a default judgment against a party that filed interrogatory
answers fifteen minutes before judgment was rendered. See Lewis v. Illinois Employers, Ins.
Co., 590 S.W.2d 119, 119 (Tex. 1979). Such eleventh-hour compliance will not immunize a
derelict party under Rule 215. Under the new Rule 215, it should not be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to follow the course of the trial court in Lewis.
41. See Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L.
REV. 457, 465-68 (1980). The 1981 amendments included new provisions in Rules 167 and
168 designed to place more authority in the hands of the trial judge to remedy non-compliance with his discovery orders. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(3) & 168(6), (8) (Vernon Supp.
1983).
42. 633 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 629.
44. See id at 630-31; see also Illinois Employers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 582 S.W.2d 242, 244
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), writ refdn.r.e per curiam,590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1979).
45. See Bottinelli v. Robinson, 594 S.W.2d 112, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ) (encouraging compliance not sole important function of sanctions).
46. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976) (severe sanctions must be available to deter those who might be tempted to abuse
discovery); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515, 518-19 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (abuse of rules has caused trend toward use of
sanctions to deter violations).
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sary does not suffer by it.47 The sanction power may now also be
used to protect an innocent party from an unreasonable burden and
expense caused by misuse of discovery.48 Finally, prevention of
needless delay and consumption of court time has been approved as
a legitimate sanction goal. 9
Rule 215, if correctly implemented, gives the trial courts of Texas
the flexibility required to orient sanction orders to these multiple
purposes. Rule 215 grants trial judges far more flexibility than they
had under the old rules. The new rule even bestows greater sanction
authority upon Texas trial courts than is enjoyed by their federal
counterparts. Examination of Rule 215's terms evinces its potential
to be forcefully used to advance the goal of substantive justice administered inexpensively with expedition and dispatch."
III.

A.

EXAMINATION OF RULE

215

The Motionfor Sanctions or Order Compelling Discovery.Subdivision 1.

Subdivision (1) establishes a procedure by which the discovering
party may bring an alleged violation of the discovery rule before the
court. This procedure is available for virtually every type of trans52
gression 5 except violation of the rules on requests for admissions,
and on physical or mental examinations.5 3 Generally, the winning
party on the motion is entitled to recover his expenses.5 4 The subdivision also contains a special proviso by which a person may enforce
47. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d
1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515,
519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (facts of case, in which crucial evidence had been destroyed, showed necessity for prompt answers).
48. See Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cost of unpenalized discovery abuse is borne by non-abusing

party).
49. See Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp., 80
F.R.D. 433, 436-37 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see alsoBottinelli v. Robinson, 594 S.W.2d, 112, 118

(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (discovery abuse deprives litigants of
access to courts and further crowds dockets).
50. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating goal of rules to be achievement of justice with "great

expedition and dispatch and at least expense" practicable).
51.
52.
53.
54.

See
See
See
See

TEX.
TEX.
TEX.
TEX.

R.
R.
R.
R.

Civ.
Civ.
Civ.
Civ.

P.
P.
P.
P.

215(l)(b)(l)-(1)(b)(3).
169, 215(4).
167a, 215(2)(7).
215(l)(d), (2)(b)(2).
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his right to recover his own statement from a party."
1. The Relief Sought
Rule 215 communicates its punch in its first sentence. That sentence reflects a great expansion of the trial judge's discretion in dealing with discovery abuse. Rule 215(1) allows a discovering party,
after reasonable notice to other parties and persons affected 56 to apply for sanctions or an order compelling discovery. The most interesting aspect of subdivision (1) is the option given the movant to
ask the court to impose sanctions on his non-complying opponent
without first obtaining a court order directing the opponent to make
discovery. 8 Thus, the trial court is free to order sanctions in a vast
category of cases in which it formerly had no such prerogative. 9
Before the effective date of the new rules, if the party from whom
discovery was requested made some response the discovering party
was necessarily obligated to move for an order to compel discovery.
Only after violation of that order could the discovering party seek
and the court impose sanctions. 60 In contrast, if a party completely
55. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(I)(e).
56. Due process requires as a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions that the resisting party be given reasonable notice of the motion for a discovery order and opportunity
to be heard thereon. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 156 Tex. 176, 181, 293
S.W.2d 639, 642 (1956); Smith v. Wilkins, 577 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1979, no writ). Subdivision (2) of Rule 215 similarly requires notice and a hearing before
the court's invocation of sanctions. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).
57. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(1).
58. Cf Tex. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b). Under this provision, the trial court is given the
commensurate authority to impose sanctions for failure to comply with a good discovery
request in the absence of a court order to do so. See id.
59. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 170, 215a(a)-(b) (Vernon 1976) (violation of court order a
requisite for imposing sanctions of taking facts as established, disallowing defenses, striking
pleadings, and award of expenses) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(l)-(2) (violation of court order
not necessary for imposition of sanctions).
60. See Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 119, 119-20 (Tex. 1979). The
Lewis case established this rule for interrogatory discovery. See id. at 119-20. This holding
survived the 1981 rewriting of former Rule 168. See Saldivar v. Facit-Addo, Inc., 620
S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ); Pope & McConnico, Practicing
Law With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 483 (1980). Former Rule 167
stipulated that if either side were unhappy with a request for production or a response
thereto it could insist on a hearing. SeeTex. R. Civ. P. 167(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983). If the
court ordered the requested party to produce and he failed to do so, former Rule 170 authorized the imposition of sanctions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976). If a deponent
appeared for his deposition, but refused to answer a question, the deposing party could seek
an order to compel the answer under the former Rule 215a. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(a)
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failed to respond to a set of interrogatories, he was subject to immediate sanction. 6 ' If a deponent was served with notice or subpoena
for a deposition and did not attend, the court was empowered to
punish him for contempt or to invoke sanctions.62 Whether a court
could impose sanctions for an absolute failure to respond to a request for production under the former rules has not been decided.63
As written, those rules seemed to make a motion to compel production and its violation prerequisite to an order of sanctions. 64 Obviously, in the absence of an order compelling discovery, the
situations in which the trial court had discretion to impose sanctions
for violation of discovery rules were very limited.
The new Rule 215 is designed to incorporate and extend the holding of Lewis v. Illinois Employers Insurance Co. 65 In Lewis, the
Texas Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's authorization to
(Vernon 1976). If that order was violated, the court was free to punish the deponent for
contempt or to order any sanction of former Rule 170. See Plodzik v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 549 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ); Henson v. Citizens
Bank of Irving, 549 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland 1977, no writ).
61. See Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1979). This
aspect of the Lewis holding also survived the 1981 amendments to the rules. SeeFears v.
Mechanical & Indus. Technicians, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983,
writ requested); Pope & McCornico, PracticingLaw With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR
L. REV. 457, 483 (1980).
62. See Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, no writ); Thomas v. Thomas, 446 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969,
writ refd n.r.e.); Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(c) (Vernon 1976). But seeHibbler v. Walker, 593
S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (contrary to former
Rule 215a(c) and to Brown and Thomas and can only be considered erroneous). There was
division among the courts as to whether sanctions could be imposed for a party's failure to
attend or to produce a witness in accordance with his agreement. Compare Roquemore v.
Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ) (trial
court's striking of pleading considered no abuse of discretion where deponent failed to appear for depositions as agreed by counsel) with Barrientos v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n,
507 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (abuse of discretion
found where trial court struck pleadings when non-party failed to appear for depositon as
agreed) and Hough v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 775, 777-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no
writ) (agreement of counsel for party to waive notice of depositions not binding on party and
no sanctions could be imposed for failing to appear).
63. See Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.). In this case, the requester moved directly for sanctions after the
other parties failed to respond. But the court did not impose sanctions until its order to
produce had been ignored. The court of appeals pointed to this fact as a consideration
serving to justify the trial court's action. Id at 632.
64. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976); Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
65. 590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1979); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 215 comment.
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impose sanctions depended on the degree of compliance or noncompliance present. When a party responded to some, but not all,
interrogatories, the interrogating party was required to move for an
order compelling the interrogated party to answer. If that order was
violated, the court had discretion to utilize sanctions. But when the
interrogated party made no response, the propounding party could
move immediately for sanctions. 66 In this manner, Lewis distinguished between a total failure to answer an entire set of interrogatories and an inadequate or incomplete response to a set of
interrogatories.
The Lewis distinction is not perpetuated by Rule 215. Rather, the
rule applicable to an absolute failure to answer interrogatories
under Lewis now obtains for any failure to adequately respond.67
This treatment is prescribed for all forms of discovery that are initiated by action of the parties independent of the court, except for
requests for admissions. 61 In other words, if the deposed, interrogated, or requested party does not respond sufficiently to one question or request for production, the discovering party may elect to
move immediately for sanctions without first obtaining an order for
discovery. 69 The Texas Supreme Court explains:

66. See Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1979).
67. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215(1), 215(2)(b).
68. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(l)(b)(l)-(l)(b)(3). The comment states: "New Rule 215
retains the conclusion reached in [Lewis] and extends such rule to cover all discovery requests, except requests for admissions." TEX. R. Civ. P. 215 comment.
69. The potential impact of this new authorization of sanctions is underscored by a
comparison with federal procedure. In federal courts the general rule is that sanctions cannot be imposed until the errant party has violated a court order. Federal Rule 37(a) provides
a mechanism by which the discovering party may move the court to compel previously requested discovery. A few federal discovery rules including Rule 35 (physical and mental
examinations), require a court order before discovery need be made. Violation of any discovery order activates the power of the trial court, upon motion, to decree sanctions under
Rule 37(b)(2). See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2282, at 757 (1970). The rule is different when the party from
whom discovery is requested completely fails (i) to attend his deposition, (2) to respond to a
set of interrogatories, or (3) to respond to a request for production. See FED. R. CIv. P.
37(d). No court order is necessary, and the discovering party may immediately move for
sanctions under federal Rule 37(d). See id. This rule also applies if the court has ordered
appearance when the order was not required. See Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's Inc.,
283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960). For sanctions to be available in the absence of a violated
court order, the failure to cooperate with discovery must be absolute. See Laclede Gas Co.
v. Warnecke Corp., 604 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Research Automation Corp.,
521 F.2d 585, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1975). The situations in which the federal trial judges have
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New Rule 215 leaves to the discretion of the court whether to impose
sanctions with or without an order compelling discovery, so that the
court will be free to apply the proper sanction order based upon the
degree of the discovery abuse involved.7"

The case of Fears v. Mechanical & Industrial Technicians, Inc.7 1

may be instructive on this point. Fears was served with interrogatories on November 4, 1980. When Fears had made no response by
December 16, 1980, Mechanical & Industrial moved to strike Fears'
answer and for default judgment. Fears' lawyer three times refused
delivery of the motion by certified mail. The lawyer also denied
that he had received a copy of the motion by regular mail. On January 26, 1981, the court struck Fears' answer and on February 5 rendered default judgment against him.7 2 The court of appeals
apparently considered these acts, evidencing scorn for the judicial
process, to justify the harsh sanction imposed in the absence of an
actual breach of a court order.73
The situations in which the court is justified in ordering sanctions
in the absence of a violaton of a previous order will not be common.
Some special circumstance will ordinarily be necessary to prevent a
direct sanction order from constituting an abuse of discretion. 4 A
complete failure to respond or to attend will warrant immediate
sanctions more often than will an insufficient response.75 But the
trial lawyer must remember that the supreme court has chosen not
to curtail the trial judge's authority simply because some answer is
discretion to impose sanctions before ordering discovery, therefore, are much more limited
than those now open to the Texas trial judge.
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215 comment. It is interesting that the Committee on Administration of Justice and the Advisory Committee suggested that sanctions be made available uder
Rule 215(2)(b) only after breach of an order commanding discovery. Instead, the Texas
Supreme Court designed the scheme herein. This is a clear indication of the court's inten-

tion to bestow broad discretionary powers upon the trial court.
71. 654 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ requested).
72. See id. at 526, 528.
73. See id at 527-28.

74. See id at 524.
75. See, e.g., Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1979)

(immediate motion for sanctions without court order requiring interrogatories be answered
is appropriate when party fails to answer any questions); Fears v. Mechanical & Indus.
Technicians, 654 S.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ requested) (imposition of
sanctions without court order commanding answers proper when no answers at all were

made to interrogatories); Thomas v. Thomas, 446 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (failure to attend deposition warranted immediate discovery
sanctions).
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made, although that answer may be insufficient. It must be expected
that the trial judge's decision will be upheld if, upon consideration
of all the circumstances that are usually evaluated in passing on a
sanction ruling, he is within his discretion in ordering sanction directly for non-compliance with a request.
2.

The Appropriate Court

Paragraph (1)(a) of Rule 215 clarifies a matter that was not directly addressed by the rules before the recent amendments. That
paragraph informs a litigant as to which court he should address his
application for a court order under the rule. Rule 215(l)(a) is, in
substance, identical to its counterpart in the federal rules, though it
is rearranged for clarity's sake.76 It pertains to both a motion to
compel discovery and a motion for sanction.
The general rule is that the motion is properly addressed to the
court in which the action is pending. Thus, Rule 215(l)(a) conforms
with the practice under the old rules." Matters relating to a deposition, however, are treated differently. If the deponent is a party to
the suit, the opposing party may address the motion to the court in
which the case is filed or to any district court in the district where
the deposition is held. If the deponent is not a party, the order may
be sought only in the deposition court. The rule is designed to spare
the non-party witness the expense and inconvenience of possible
cross-state travel to defend himself.78 The former rules authorized
both courts, in different measure, to deal with any deposition dispute regardless of whether the witness was a party.7 9 Consistent
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
77. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976); Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(3), 168(6), 168(7)(3),
168(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983). The objection and sanction provisions of the former rules, with
the exception of former Rule 215a, consistently referred to "the court" without explanation.
Read in context, such references are obviously to the court where the case is pending. This
intention becomes clearer when the other rules are contrasted with former Rule 215a, which
has always distinguished between the lawsuit court and the deposition court. See Tex. R.

Civ. P. 215a (Vernon 1976). A motion to compel discovery or to invoke sanctions, other
than for transgression of the deposition rules, therefore, had to be addressed to the court in
which the lawsuit was filed. This is explicitly stated in new Rule 215(l)(a). See TEX. R. Civ.
P. 215(l)(a).
78. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 662 F.2d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
79. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a (Vernon 1976). Under former Rule 215a, a deponent's
failure to answer a question propounded on oral or written examination could result in an

order compelling an answer by the court in which the action was pending or by the court in
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with the old rule,8 ° matters relating to an oral deposition and matters relating to a deposition on written questions are treated
identically.8 '
Cross-reference should be made to two other items in Rule 215,
paragraphs (1)(d) and (2)(a). Paragraph (1)(d) requires "the court"
to award a recovery of expenses, including attorney fees, to the prevailing party on a motion to compel unless opposition was substantially justified or the award would be unjust.8 2 The phrase "the
court" as used in paragraph (1)(d) must be understood as defined by
paragraph (1)(a). The deposition court is therefore under the same
command and has the same authority to require the payment of expenses on a motion to compel as does the court presiding over the
84
suit.8 3 This is consistent with former practice under the old rules.
Rule 215(2)(a) delimits the sanction authority of the deposition
court. That court is empowered to punish a witness for contempt if
he fails to appear or to be sworn or to answer a question after being
directed by the court to do so. In contrast, the court in which the
action is pending has broad discretion to apply any of an array of
sanctions. 85 This will often render the latter court a more attractive
forum in which to pursue a motion against a party deponent.
3. The Motion
The actual authorization of the motion for an order compelling
compliance with a discovery request or imposing sanctions is found
the deposition district. See id.
215a(a). Violation of that order or the refusal of a deponent to
be sworn after being ordered to do so was punishable by either court as contempt. In addition, the court in which the lawsuit was filed could impose further just sanctions. See id
215a(b). Failure by any witness to appear for his deposition as directed by proper notice or
subpoena could be treated as contempt by either court. The court with jurisdiction of the
case could impose severe sanctions on a party under these circumstances. See id 215a(c).
80. See id.215a(a), 215a(c).
81. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(l)(a). That "matters relating to a deposition" is used in
Rule 215(l)(a) to refer to depositions on both oral and written questions is evidenced by
subparagraph (l)(b)(2). See TEX. R. COv. P. 215(I)(b)(2). That provision clearly indicates
that the procedures designed in subdivision (1) apply to both forms of depositions.
82. See id 215(l)(d).
83. The authority of the deposition court to require the payment of expenses on a motion to compel discovery is consistent with the policy of discouraging frivolous resort to the
courts. This policy underlies provisions for such awards found in TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(!)(d),
(l)(c), (2)(b)(8), (3), and (4)(b).
84. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(a) (Vernon 1976).
85. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 4, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:767

in Rule 215(l)(b). The transgressions that justify the motion are
listed in subparagraphs (1) through (3). In general, a motion under
Rule 215(1) is made available for virtually any breach of the rules
regulating depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production.
The violations specified in paragraph (1)(b) include absolute failures to make discovery. If a deponent utterly fails to appear for the
taking of his deposition8 6 or if a corporate or other entity deponent
fails to designate a person to testify, 87 the motion will be available.
Similarly, a motion may be employed when a party ignores a set of
interrogatories88 or a request for production. 89 And the same motion may be made when the deponent appears, but will not answer a
question.9" The discovering party may also move for a discovery
order or for sanctions for failure to answer a single interrogatory. 9 '
Finally, a failure to respond that all discovery sought by a request
for production will be allowed or failure to allow discovery that is
requested will authorize a Rule 215(1) motion.92
Furthermore, while two actions that infract the deposition rules
are not expressly listed in Rule 215(1)(b), they are unquestionably
implied in the rule. Since paragraph (1)(b) covers violations by a
non-party deponent, failure to appear after being subpoenaed is
necessarily included in the provision for failure to appear pursuant
to "proper notice."93 Also, a deponent's refusal to be sworn must be
encompassed by the provisions relative to a deponent's failure to
appear or refusal to be sworn. 94

The breadth of the Texas trial judge's discretion in dealing with
discovery disputes is again stressed by a comparison with federal
practice. 95 All the transgressions contained in Rule 215(1)(b) are
86. See id 215(1)(b)(2)(a).
87. See id 215(1)(b)(1).
88. See id 215(i)(b)(3)(a).
89. See id 215(1)(b)(3)(c).
90. See id.215(1)(b)(2)(b).
91. See id.215(1)(b)(3)(b).
92. See id 215(l)(b)(3)(d).
93. See id 215(l)(b)(2)(a). This interpretation is in conformity with previous practice.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(c) (Vernon 1976). ,
94. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(1)(b)(2). This reading of the rule is consistent with previous
practice. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(b) (Vernon 1976).
95. For a similar comparison with pre-1984 Texas practice see supra text accompanying
notes 55-69.
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also dealt with by the federal sanctions rule.96 The federal rule,
however, provides two distinct procedures. Generally, any failure
less extreme than a complete non-response only allows a federal
court to order discovery. 97 Then, only upon violation of that order
is a federal court empowered to order sanctions.98 On the other
hand, a federal court may immediately invoke sanctions for an absolute failure to respond to a request. 99
A potentially useful procedural change is found in the penultimate sentence of Rule 215(l)(b). A deposing party may adjourn an
oral deposition and promptly move for an order. Alternatively, he
may complete the examination and then move for an order under
Rule 215(l)(b). Under the old rules, if the deposing party was unhappy with an answer or a refusal to answer, he was obligated to
finish the questioning on other matters before a motion was
proper. °0
The words of the provision make the discovering party's option
absolute. He should be free to make the choice based on depositon
strategy so as to make the deposition as efficacious as possible. One
case under the federal provision does counsel some caution. In Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 101 the examining counsel haulted a depositon to contest the depondent's claim of privilege.
The deponent returned to his home in California from New York
where the deposition was being taken. Not only did the trial court
sustain the assertion of privilege, but it ordered the deposing party
to pay opposing counsel's fees and expenses incurred in the trip to
0 2
California to finish the examination.
The last sentence of paragraph (1)(b) is one of several provisions
intended to protect the person from whom discovery is sought from
the inconvenience and expense of an unjustified effort at discovery.
96. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2), (d).

97. Id at 37(a).
98. Id at 37(b)(2). The purpose of the requirement that a party from whom discovery
is sought be ordered to make discovery before he is subject to imposition of sanctions is to
ensure that he is "given adequate notice and an opportunity to contest the discovery. .. "
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1981). The philosophy

of the new Texas rule is to require proper exercise of discretion so that sanctions are not
unjustly imposed.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
100. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(a) (Vernon 1976).
101. 27 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
102. See id at 429.
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The new rule expands the trial court's power to force discovery and
to protect litigants and other parties from unfounded requests. Accordingly, if the court denies a motion to compel discovery or a motion for sanctions, it may make any protective order permitted by
Rule 166b. 103
Essentially the same standards apply to a motion for a protective
order made in response to a motion to compel discovery as apply to
a motion made before the time for discovery. That is, the burden is
on the movant to show his entitlement to protection. Additionally,
the decision of whether to issue a protective order is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court." Review of the trial court's de0 5
cision is had only on the grounds of a clear abuse of discretion.'
There is, however, an additional consideration when the motion
for protection is delayed until the discovering party brings the matter to court. Rule 166b(4), unlike the predecessor provision of former Rule 186b, 10 6 does not require that a motion for a protective
order be made "seasonably." Nevertheless, timeliness of the motion, under the circumstances, may be considered in deciding
whether to grant the motion. 07 Thus, the courts may expect some
explanation of why the protective order was not sought earlier.108
The safe practice is for the person opposing discovery to move for
the protective order as soon as the need is realized.
4.

Evasive or Incomplete Answer

Historically, Texas appellate courts have evidently entertained no
doubt that our trial courts are empowered to compel full answers to
103. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4). For a discussion of protective orders see Barrow &
Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil ProcedureAffecting Discovery, 15
ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 734 (1984).
104. See Alice Nat'l Bank v. Edwards, 408 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1966, no writ).
105. See Fisher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 186b (Vernon 1976).
107. See Jolly v. Superior Court, 540 P.2d 658, 660 (Ariz. 1975); 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2035, at 262-63 (1970).
108. Cf Automatic Drilling Mach., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. 1974).
The Texas Supreme Court held that a motion for a protective order could not be overruled
just because it was not made until the deposition had commenced. The court in Millercited
extenuating circumstances that indicated the motion was "seasonable." Id at 260. Under
the new rule, since the moton is not required to be "seasonably made," less extreme extenuating circumstances should be sufficient.
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discovery questions.' °9 This power is now expressed in Rule
215(l)(c). For purposes of subdivision (1) of Rule 215, an evasive or
incomplete answer is no answer at all. 10 This rule inspired one
court to warn:
[It is a dangerous practice which incurs risk of possible sanctions for
a party to limit an interrogatory addressed to it to only a portion of
the information which it expressly requests. Parties like witnesses are
required to state the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth
in answering written interrogatories. "'1
The party who asserts that an answer is inadequate has the burden to prove the answer's incompleteness or evasiveness." 2 Of
course, whether an answer is insufficient must be determined under
all the circumstances of the particular controversy,' 3 and the general rule is said to be that candor is required. That is, the answering
party must candidly reveal the information sought, or must candidly
state that he objects to the query.' 1 4 The trial court does not abuse
its discretion by refusing to order a better answer, even though the
questions could have been more fully answered, if the answers made
are adequate.' '5
A rough idea of what kind of answer fails under paragraph (1)(c)
can be gathered from the cases. A partial answer that reserves some
possible future objection has been held to be no answer at all."16 A
declaration that the documents containing the information sought
109. See, e.g., Alexander v. Barlow, No. 01-82-0640-cu (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (not yet reported) (trial court's sanction of striking defendant's answer
for incomplete answers to interrogatories upheld); Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (no abuse of discretion when trial court
struck defendant's answers for incomplete interrogatories); Young Cos. v. Bayou Corp., 545
S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ) (trial court's action in striking
defendant's answers for answering interrogatories in bad faith upheld). This rule, while
stated in general terms, will have its greatest effect on discovery by interrogatories.
110. Rule 215(l)(c) is a verbatim adoption of Federal Rule 37(a)(3). For that reason,
several federal cases are relied on in this discussion.
111. See Hunter v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 56 F.R.D. 617, 631 (W.D. Mo.
1972).
112. See Daiflon v. Allied Chem. Corp., 534 F.2d 221, 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
113. See Alexander v. Barlow, No. 01-82-0640-cu (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (not yet reported).
114. See Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1977).
115. Local 472, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting
Indus. v. Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1982).
116. See Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1977).
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are unavailable may be evasive because the answering party does
not state whether he has personal knowledge of the answers." 7 Reference to attached documents that do not contain the answers requested is insufficient." 8 Answers such as "unknown" and
"denied" have been held so blatantly inadequate as to indicate bad
faith.' 19 An interrogated party who answers by referring the interrogating party to company records must state that the desired information is in the records. 20 A response that the answer might be
there is deficient. 2 ' Further, a general answer to a specific question
22
will not suffice.'
In this regard, specific mention must be made of Phillps v. Vinson
Petroleum Supply Co. '23 In Phillips, the court held that the trial
court, upon finding interrogatory answers to be insufficient, must
tell the responding party the specific nature of the deficiencies and
must grant an opportunity for that party to cure the errors. Only
then may sanctions be ordered.' 24 Whatever may be said of the
Phillps holding before April 1, 1984, it is clearly too broad under
new Rule 215. Under the new rule, sanctions are authorized any
time a set of interrogatory answers contains even one inadequate
reply. Circumstances such as whether the interrogated party was
given an opportunity to supplement or amend are relevant only
upon review for abuse of discretion.
5. The Award of Expenses
Almost twenty years ago, United States District Court Judge
Lloyd MacMahon penned this oft-quoted cry of frustration:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed as an affirmative aid to substantive justice, and those who choose to read them re117. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
118. Alexander v. Barlow, No. 01-82-0640-cu (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.) (not yet reported).
119. See Young Cos. v. Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977, no writ).
120. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(2); see alsoBarrow & Henderson, 1984Amendments to the
Texas Rules ofCivil ProcedureAffecing Discopery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 740-41 (1984).
121. See In re Master Key, 53 F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Conn. 1971); cf. Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied

Chem. Corp., 534 F.2d 221, 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
122. See Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 541 F. Supp. 307, 313 n.8 (D. Colo.
1982).

123. 581 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
124. See id at 792.
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strictively do so at their peril. It is time that depositions be conducted
by members of the bar in a cooperative manner, in accordance with
both the letter and spirit of the rules, without petty bickering and
without intervention by busy courts with more important matters
pressing for attention. It is clear to us that plaintiffs' attorney has no
conception of his obligation to observe the rules "as an officer of the
court" or otherwise. Rather, he appears to be bent on concealing vital
facts or, at best, waging a war of delay, expense, harassment and frustration. There is no justification for his conduct, no basis at all for his
instructing the deponents not to answer. As a result, the cooprative
atmosphere 12envisaged
by the federal rules has been poisoned by
5
antagonism.

Modem discovery should be conducted by the litigants, according
to the rules, and without court intervention. The court should have
to step in only to settle a legitimate controversy that requires impartial determination.'

26

Rule 215(l)(d) is designed to encourage the

parties to leave the trial court 127out of discovery matters unless adjudication is genuinely needed.
The thrust of Rule 215(l)(d) is that when the adversaries carry a
discovery dispute before the court the losing party can expect to pay
expenses. That is, to the victor goes expenses and attorney fees. 128
The court must afford an opportunity for hearing on the matter
before an award of expenses can be made. 129 At the hearing, the
125. Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
126. See Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 20-21 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd sub nom.
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 833
(1979).
127. Rule 215(i)(d) is patterned after federal Rule 37(a)(4). In commenting on the federal provision, Professors Wright and Miller state:
A major purpose of the 1970 revision of the discovery rules was to encourage extrajudicial discovery with a minimum of court intervention. One means of accomplishing
that was to tighten the judicial sanctions with respect to unjustified insistence upon or
objection to discovery. This led the draftsmen to place 'new emphasis on the availability and compulsory nature of an award of expenses.'
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2288, at 786 (1970);
accord Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77 F.R.D. 750, 751 (W.D. Mo. 1978); FED. R.
Civ. P. 37(a)(4) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules; 4A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE
37.02 [10.-I], at 37-49 (2d ed. 1983).
128. This was the intent and effect of the promulgation of a similar provision in the
federal rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules; 4A J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 37.02 [10.-i], at 37-49, (2d ed. 1983); 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288, at 787-88 (1970).
129. See Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77 F.R.D. 750, 752 n.I (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(requirement of hearing under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)).
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unsuccessful party on the motion has the burden of showing that his
position was substantially justified. Alternatively, the loser may
seek to show that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust. If one of these exceptions is not shown, the prevailing party
is entitled to recover his expenses on the motion including reasonable attorney fees. If the court grants part of the motion and denies
part, the court may apportion the expenses in a just manner. 3 °
By its terms, Rule 215(l)(d) applies only to the disposition of a
motion to compel discovery. But what is said regarding paragraph
(1)(d) is also generally applicable to the disposition of: (1) a motion
to determine the sufficiency of answers or objections to requests for
admissions,' 3' (2) a motion to force production of the movant's own
statement, 32 (3) a motion for sanctions for failure to make discovery, 13 3 and (4) a motion for sanctions for abuse of the discovery
34
process.
Recovery of expenses by the prevailing party on any of these motions should be more attainable under Rule 215 than in the past.
Before the 1984 changes, the rules contained four provisions for an
award of expenses when the court had to resolve a discovery quarrel. An award was available to the winning party on a motion to
compel an answer to a deposition question if the winner could prove
that his adversary's position was not substantially justified. 35 The
same standard was applied when awarding expenses on a motion to
36
determine the adequacy of a reply to requests for admissions.
The court could award expenses to the party resisting a request for
production if the court found the request to be outside the scope of
the rules or unreasonably frivolous or harassing. If the response to a
130. One commentator has noted that in apportioning the expenses, the court will
weigh the extent to which each party was successful and justified. See 4A J. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
37.02 [10.-3], at 37-51 (2d ed. 1983). In federal practice,
however, the entire burden of expenses has generally been placed on the party more at fault.
See Shenker v. Sportelli, 83 F.R.D. 365, 366-67 (E.D. Pa. 1979); White v. Beloginis, 53
F.R.D. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
131. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(4)(b) (incorporates Rule 215(l)(d)).
132. See id 215(l)(e) (contains provision substantially parallel to Rule 215(l)(d)).
133. See id at 215(2)(b)(8) (provides for recovery of expenses in essentially same terms
as Rule 215(l)(d)).
134. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3). This provision incorporates Rule 215(2)(b)(8), which
in turn is roughly equivalent to Rule 215(l)(d).
135. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(a) (Vernon 1976).
136. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 169 (Vernon 1976).
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request for production was shown to be unreasonably frivolous or
made for the purpose of delay, the discovering party could recover
expenses. 37 Similarly, if interrogatories were unreasonable, frivolous, or harassing, the court could award expenses to the objecting
party. If, on the other hand, the interrogated party's objections were
found unreasonable, frivolous, or made for delay, or if a good faith
effort to answer was not made, the propounding party could recover
his expenses. 38 Some stretching of the request for production and
interrogatory rules was required to find authorization of an award
of expenses when the party from39whom discovery was sought had
completely ignored the requests.
Rule 215 seeks to replace this existing set of rules with one standard for the award of expenses on any discovery motion. The burden is shifted to the unsuccessful litigant to establish that his
position was substantially justified or that the award for some reason would be unjust. 4 0 These changes are intended to make an
award of expenses more readily available and thus to4 discourage
avoidable court intervention in the discovery process.' '
Texas appellate courts have not defined "substantial justification." Some understanding may be gained, however, by considering
the construction given the same term under the federal rules. Of
course, whether a party's insistence on or resistence to discovery in a
particular case is justified depends on the circumstances. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 37 indicates that the issue
depends on whether a genuine dispute exists. 142 When one party's
right to the desired information or the other's right to withhold it
137. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
138. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(6) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
139. See Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 633-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976); Tex. R. Civ. P.
167(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983); cf. Tharp v. Blackwell, 570 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1978, no writ).
140. Cf Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77 F.R.D. 750, 751 (W.D. Mo. 1978);
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273, 279 (E.D.
Wis. 1975) (expenses awarded to winning party since losing party submitted nothing to indicate that expenses should not be awarded).
141. See Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77 F.R.D. 750, 751 (W.D. Mo. 1978); FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. The note
reads: "On many occasions, to be sure, the dispute is genuine, though ultimately resolved
one way or the other by the court. In such cases, the losing party is substantially justified in
carrying the matter to court." Id.
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raises difficult legal issues, resort to judicial resolution is warranted.'43 In other words, if the disputed issue is one on which reasonable minds could genuinely differ, neither side is without
substantial justification in forcing a hearing. A good faith belief will
not immunize the party from an award of expenses if there is no
fairly litigable issue. 44
Since the 1970 amendments to the federal rules, federal courts
have frequently charged expenses against the resisting party. 14 5 Discovering parties have also been held to act without substantial justification in seeking to compel discovery. 4 6 But it must be
remembered that the permissible scope of discovery is broad, and if
information sought is not clearly improper the discovering party
may be considered substantially justified. 4 7 On the other hand,
Texas rulemakers have been very concerned over runaway discov148
ery that may be used to bury an opponent in paper and expense.
A party to a Texas lawsuit should consider challenging discovery
49
when it appears that he is being victimized by this practice. 1
One added feature to the award of expense rule that is noteworthy
143. 4A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 37.02 (10.-1], at 37-49 (2d ed. 1983).
144. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288, at
790 (1970).
145. A party who neither answers objections, nor seeks an extension of time to answer
interrogatories clearly cannot claim justification. See Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77
F.R.D. 750, 751 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Hunter v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 56 F.R.D.
617, 631-32 (W.D. Mo. 1972). A deponent is not justified in refusing to answer because of
an unfounded assertion of privilege. See Palma v. Lake Wankomis Dev. Co., 48 F.R.D.
366, 369-70 (W.D. Mo. 1970). Likewise, evasive or incomplete answers are not warranted.
See Bates v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 83 F.R.D. 535, 539-40 (D.S.C. 1979); Powerlock
Sys., Inc. v. Duo-Lock, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 50, 52 (E.D. Wisc. 1972). Certainly, once the trial
court has ordered a deponent to answer, further refusal is not justified. See Weigel v. Shapiro, 608 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1979).
146. A deposing party who challenges a correct claim of privilege has been held to lack
justification. See Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 27 F.R.D. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). Where an interrogating party propounds questions outside the scope delineated by a
previous court order he is subject to payment of expenses. See Whitehouse lnvs. Ltd. v.
Bernstein, 51 F.R.D. 163, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Furthermore, a party who persists in asking
questions that have been ruled irrelevant does so without justification. See Unilectric, Inc. v.
Holwin Corp., 243 F.R.D. 393, 349-400 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 830 (1958).
147. See Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1972).
148. See Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L.
REV. 457, 461-63 (1980). In fact, the concern over out-of-control discovery is the driving
factor behind the Texas Supreme Court's inclusion of subdivision (3) in Rule 215.
149. Of course, the wise course by which to challenge an harassing discovery effort is a
motion for protective order or an objection rather than requiring the request.
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is the provision for an award against the attorney for the unsuccessful party. The purpose is to deter attorneys from instigating harassing or dilatory tactics. 5 ' The award may be against the attorney
only or against the attorney and client jointly.
The righteousness or wickedness of the idea may be, and has
been, debated.' 5 ' In defense of the provision, it has been said:
"Thus is placed directly on attorneys a somewhat unique sanction to
refrain from the frivolous, to weigh carefully considerations of relevancy and privilege, and to advise in accordance with their best
judgment."' 52 No one in the legal profession would contest the
healthiness of these desired effects. There is a recognized danger
that legitimate efforts at discovery might be inhibited.' 53 The court
must be careful to implement this sanction in a way that advances
its salutory purpose while avoiding its potential danger. The attorney should be made to pay his adversary's expenses only when it is
shown that the attorney's advice is at the root of the unjustified conduct. 154 That is, when imposition of other sanctions would punish
the court should consider chargthe client for the sins of his counsel,
155
lawyer.
the
against
expenses
ing
The last sentence of paragraph (1)(d) provides a standard by
which to measure the amount recoverable. "Reasonable expenses,
including attorneys fees" are defined as "expenses which are reasonable in relation to the amount of work reasonably expended." This
stipulation makes clear that the award under Rule 215(l)(d) is provided not as penalty but as reimbursement. 56 The court will be re150. Minutes of the Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court of Texas (Nov. 12-13,
1982) (comments of Mr. Beck and Mr. McConnico).
151. Actually, the debate resulted in the Committee on Administration of Justice rec-

ommending the provision for sanctions against attorneys and the Advisory Committee recommending against it. The Texas Supreme Court preferred the approach of the Committee
on Administration of Justice. An interesting debate of the matter by some outstanding

members of the legal community is recorded in the Minutes of the Advisory Committee for
the Supreme Court of Texas, at 109-22 (Nov. 12-13, 1982).
152. Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV.

633, 650 (1952).
153. See Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1982).
154. See Humphreys Exterminating Co. v. Poulter, 62 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D. Md. 1974);
Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633, 636 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
155. See Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

156. Cf.United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th
Cir. 1980). In Sumitomo, the award was justified not only as compensation to the wronged
party but also as a fine to deter future abuse. See id.at 1371. The justification relied upon
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quired to receive evidence to determine the proper amount to
award.' 57 An award made under Rule 215(l)(d) is to be paid at the
time directed by the court. Thus, the trial court may stipulate that
payment is to be immediate or that the amount will be taxed as cost.
Regardless of when the payment is ordered, the order is only appealable upon final judgment. This evidently is the rule when the
award 58is against the attorney as well as when it is against the
party.
6.

The Motion To Recover a Person's Own Statement

Rule 215(l)(e) clarifies a matter left to implication under the 1981
amendments. In 1973, a paragraph was added to former Rule 167
that established a person's right to recover his own statement concerning the subject of a lawsuit from a party who had possession of
the statement. The former rule also provided a means to enforce the
right. Two sentences of the new paragraph arranged for a motion to
force the production of the statement and for an award of expenses
on the motion.'59 Those two sentences were dropped in the 1981
amendments, and the remainder of the paragraph became former
Rule 167(6).16o The motion to compel production and the award of
expenses were available
under former Rule 167(3) dealing with ob6

jections in general.' '

The new Rule 166b(2)(g) is a verbatim adoption of former Rule
167(6).162 It does not contain any means to enforce the right it em-

bodies. It would be stretching Rule 215 to find a remedy without
paragraph (1)(e), because the balance of the rule provides remedies
for parties only. Realizing the inadequacy if no remedy was proin Sumitomofor the amount of the expenses awarded will not be sufficient under Rule
215(l)(d).
157. See Weigel v. Shapiro, 608 F.2d 268, 272 (7th Cir. 1979); Lakeside Bridge & Steel
Co. v. Mountain State Const. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273, 279 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
158. Federal practice permits the attorney to appeal the order against him immediately.
See Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir. 1982).
159. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167 Historical Note (Vernon 1976).
160. See Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L.
REV. 457, 472 (1980); see alsoTex. R. Civ. P. 167(6) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
161. See Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L.

REV. 457, 472 (1980); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 167 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
162. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(g); For a discussion of this section, see Barrow &
Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil ProcedureAffecting Discovery, 15
ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 715-35 (1984).
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vided, the Advisory Committee added Rule 215(l)(e),' 6 3 which permits the person desiring return of his statement to move the court to
order its production and provides for a recovery of expenses similar
to that found in paragraph (1)(d). 6 4
B.

Sanctionsfor Failure To Comply with Discovery Orders or
Requests.: Subdivision 2.

Subdivision 2 empowers the court to use sanctions to force a person from whom discovery is sought to permit or provide discovery
in compliance with the rules. The deposition court is granted sanction power to deal with a recalcitrant deponent. 65 The court in
which the action is pending is authorized to invoke a wide range of
sanctions to force discovery. 166 The rule also provides for the enforcement of an order to produce directed to a non-party.'67
1. Sanctions by the Deposition Court
A motion to compel a deponent to appear or to be sworn or to
answer a question may be addressed to any district court in the district where the deposition is held. 6 ' If that order is not honored,
Rule 215(2)(a) permits punishment of the reluctant deponent. Paragraph (2)(a) stipulates that a deponent may be held in contempt of
court if, after being directed by the deposition court to appear, or to
be sworn, or to answer a question, he fails to comply.
This provision represents only minor deviations from earlier practice. Under the old rule, the deposition court and the court in which
the action was pending had concurrent jurisdiction over deposition
disputes regardless of whether the deponent was a party. The court
that ordered compliance could punish a violation of its order by
holding the deponent in contempt of court. The deposing party always had the option of going to either court.' 6 9 Presently, Rules
215(l)(a) and (2)(a) require that if the deponent is not a party to the
lawsuit, the deposing party may only seek an order from the deposi163. Minutes of the Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court of Texas, at 106-08
(Nov. 12-13, 1982).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See
See
See
See
See
See

TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(1)(e).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(a).
id. 215(2)(b).
id 215(2)(c).
id. 215(l)(a).
Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a (Vernon 1976).
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tion court. Likewise, the discovering party may seek a contempt citation against the intransigent witness only in the deposition court.
Arguably, another small change in procedure is effected by paragraph (2)(a). The former rule made a deponent who failed to appear for his deposition after service of subpoena immediately
subject to a contempt citation.1 70 Rule 215(2)(a) may be read to demand violation of a special court order to appear in order to subject
the absent deponent to penalties for contempt. A subpoena, however, is a lawful mandate of the court. If a subpoenaed witness does
not attend his deposition, therefore, a contempt citation should be
obtainable. '7 1
2.

Sanctions by the Court in Which the Action Is Pending
Paragraph (2)(b) is the mainstay of Rule 215. It is a sweeping
grant of power to the court in which the action is pending to utilize
sanctions against the parties to force discovery. A study of this paragraph's provisions further reveals the tremendous scope of the
power bestowed upon the trial court to deal with efforts to frustrate
discovery.
The sanctions of paragraph (2)(b) are imposable for the misdeeds
of parties, or of officers, directors, or managing agents of parties, or
of persons designated to testify on an entity party's behalf. Consistent with the scheme of Rule 215(1), this provision empowers the
court to resort directly to sanctions upon a failure to comply with a
proper discovery request. 172 Alternatively, the court may wait to decree sanctions until a discovery order is violated. If an order is in
effect at the time a motion for sanctions is brought, the issue becomes whether that order was violated. The propriety of the underlying discovery request will have been determined when discovery
was ordered. 173 In reviewing a decree ordering discovery sanctions
170. See id 215a(c) (Vernon 1976).
171. See Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (8th Cir. 1975). In
Fisher, the court noted:

A district court has inherent power to enforce compliance with its lawful orders and
mandates by awarding civil contempt damages, including attorneys fees. . . . A subpoena is a lawfully issued mandate of the court issued by the clerk thereof. It is the

responsibility of every citizen to respond to this mandate.
Id

at 1340-41.
172. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).
173. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
790-91 (1970).

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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for violation of a discovery order, the appellate court will consider
the propriety of the order. 74 The trial court's decision whether to
order discovery or to immediately impose sanctions is relevant only
to a determination of whether it abused its discretion.
Rule 215(2)(b) sanctions are available for a party's failure to obey
any order to provide or permit discovery. The import of this general
language is to allow sanctions for any order that has the effect of
commmanding that discovery be made no matter what rule authorized the order.' 75 The rule specifically includes Rule 167a orders to
submit to physical or mental examination or to produce another for
examination and orders pursuant to Rule 215(1).176
Before imposing sanctions for the violation of any discovery request or order, the noncomplying party must be given notice and a
hearing. Not only are these safeguards required by Rule 215, but
due process also demands that the allegedly derelict party be afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before
sanctons are invoked. t7 7 Even if fair notice and hearing are given,
the imposition of sanctions may offend the requisites of due process.' 78 The United States Supreme Court in InsuranceCorp. of Ire174. See Lueg v. Tewell, 572 S.w.2d 97, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ).
175. Cf. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633, 636 (N.D.
Tex. 1977); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) Advisory Committee's Note. For example, inAssociated
Radio Service Co., the trial court treated its previous order mandating a discovery conference and a report thereon as an order to permit or provide discovery within the meaning of
Federal Rule 37(b)(2). See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633,
636 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
176. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).
177. See Lueg v. Tewell, 572 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ); Plodzik v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 549 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ); see also Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1343 (8th Cir.
1975); cf. Fears v. Mechanical & Indus. Technicians, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1983, writ requested). In Fears,the court of appeals upheld a default judgment,
rendered as a discovery sanction, over appellant's complaint that he had no notice of appellee's motion. Id Appellant had three times refused delivery of notice by registered mail and
claimed to have never received notice by regular mail. The court found that notice had been
accomplished in accordance with Rule 21a. Id. at 529. At this writing, application for writ
of error in Fears is pending before the Texas Supreme Court. Comment on the case would
be inappropriate. Notice and hearing are also prerequisite to an order compelling discovery.
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 156 Tex. 176, 181, 293 S.W.2d 639, 642 (1956);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).
178. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 209-11 (1958); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1909); Hovey
v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 414-15 (1897). See generally Note, The Emerging DeterrenceOrienta-
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land v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee '79 articulated due process
requirements that seem applicable to discovery sanction orders in
general. Compagnie des Bauxites, it is submitted, holds that for a
sanction decree to pass constitutional muster it must be just, and be
specifically related to the harm done by the condemned conduct.
The first standard merely requires that in the circumstances of the
particular case the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The second standard requires that the remedy for the subject discovery
abuse be tailored to redress the resultant prejudice to the other
party. 8 Examination of the sanctions authorized by Rule 215 (2)(b)
must be made with these due process concerns in mind.
a. Orders as Are Just
Paragraph (2)(b), while specifically authorizing a broad range of
sanctions, permits the trial judge some room for artistic deviation.
The court is directed to invoke orders as are just, and is not confined
to the list that ensues. This phraseology encourages the trial court to
adjust his sanction decree in a way that most efficaciously promotes
its purpose in the situation confronted. The power to impose these
sanctions should be equally as broad, flexible, and plural as the
power to use one of the specific sanctions.' 8 '
Although the provision for just sanctions has been resorted to infrequently, the use of such sanctions has been upheld under similarly worded former rules. 182 One Texas appeals court wisely relied
on the "as are just" language to approve the trial court's invocation
of a sanction that seemed fair, but arguably was not expressly provided for under the former rule. 183 Considerable resourcefulness
was exhibited by the trial court in Firestone Photographs,Inc. v.
Lamaster.184 In Lamaster, an order assessing periodic monetary
ion in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1041-44 (1978) (discus-

sion of constitutional issues involving imposition of sanctions).
179. - U.S. __ 102 S. Ct. 2099, - L. Ed. 2d - (1982).
180. See id at ____,102 S. Ct. at 2107-08, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
181. See Comment, Imposition and Selection of Sanctions in Texas PretrialDiscovery
Procedure,31 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 193 (1979).
182. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) (trial court can order sanctions "as are just")
with Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976) (orders "as are just") and 215a(b) (Vernon 1976)

(orders "as are just").
183. See Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 634 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th
Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).

184. 567 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
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penalties for continued disobedience was approved as a just sanction in the circumstances.1 8 5 In an interesting federal case, the trial
court in essence shifted the burden of proof because of the non-burdened party's failure to make discovery. 8 6 The trial court's margin
for creativity, however, is not unlimited. In GeneralMotors Corp. v.
Lawrence, 17 the Supreme Court of Texas bluntly held that
"[c]ompelling discovery of non-relevant material. . . is not one of
the available sanctions . ...
b.

Disallowing Further Discovery

Rule 215(2)(b)(1) embodies a new sanction heretofore unknown
to the Texas or federal rules. 8 9 Subparagraph (2)(b)(1) permits the
court to disallow the disobedient party the use of further discovery
of any kind or of a particular kind. This proviso's long absence
from civil procedure is mildly surprising since its very nature is a
logical inclusion in an array of discovery sanctions. If a party does
not responsibly use a discovery weapon, he may be restrained from
using further discovery tools.
There are two points which need be made concerning this new
sanction device. First, it seems to be naturally suited for use against
the discovering party. For instance, the too common tactic of burying the adversary in paperwork and litigation expense may be
checked by this sanction. The use of Rule 215(2)(b)(1) is authorized
by subdivision (3) of the rule. 190 Second, the flexibility of this type
of sanction makes it possible to tailor the sanction to meet the specific transgression presented. For example, in an order to halt discovery of a particular kind, the court can prevent the sanctioned
party from using one form of discovery or from seeking information
regarding one aspect or issue of the case. Of course, this sanction
should not lightly be invoked. The modern approach to litigation is
185. See id at 277. For a good discussion of "as are just" sanctions and a cogent criticism of Lamaster see Comment, Imposition and Selection ofSanctions in Texas PretrialDiscovery Procedure,31 BAYLOR L. REV. 191 (1979).
186. See S.E.C. v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 24 F.R.D. 460, 468 (S.D.

Cal. 1959).
187. 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983).

188. Id at 734.
189. Some use has been made of the type of sanctions contemplated by Rule
215(2)(b)(1). See Park-Tower Dev. Group, Inc. v. Goldfeld, 87 F.R.D. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
190. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3).
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to encourage wide-open discovery among the parties. Thus, the
power to limit discovery should not be abused by its utilization
against a non-deserving litigant or a broader use than appropriate to
remedy the particular abuse.
c.

Charging Expenses of Discovery or Taxable Court Costs

Rule 215(2)(b)(2) authorizes a second new sanction. 19' This subparagraph permits the trial court to charge discovery expenses
and/or taxable court costs against the disobedient party. This sanction is similar to the other provisions for reimbursement of expenses
necessitated by improper discovery conduct; 92 however, it is potentially much more devastating because the award is not necessarily
tied to the cost resulting from the abuse. This subparagraph states
that, in an appropriate case, the court can tax all the expenses of
discovery against one litigant or his attorney. This could amount to
a staggering sum.
In the usual case, this subparagraph envisions a more modest
award. Wise use of discretion will ordinarily require a connection
between the award and the discovery violation redressed. That is,
an award of expenses or court costs caused by or related to a certain
misdeed will more often be appropriate than will a larger award.
The award should not be against the attorney unless it is clear that
93
he instigated the violation.
d.

Facts Taken as Established

Subparagraph (2)(b)(3) grants the court discretion to order that
designated facts of the case shall be taken to be established in accordance with the claim of the innocent party. This sanction has
been available under the Texas rules since 1941.194 Rule 215 retains
the definition of the sanction and expands its availability. 95 This
191. The sanctions of Rule 215(2)(b)(2) have also been used without specific authorization. Cf Park-Tower Dev. Group, Inc. v. Goldfeld, 87 F.R.D. 96, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

192. Cf TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(1)(d), (2)(b)(8), (3), (4)(c).
193. Humphreys Exterminating Co. v. Poulter, 62 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D. Md. 1974).
194. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170(a), 215a(b) (Vernon 1976); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(8) (Vernon
Supp. 1983).
195. Before the 1984 amendments took effect, this penalty was available for non-compliance with an order to produce, Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976), or for non-compliance
with an order to answer deposition questions, id at 215a(b) (Vernon 1976), or for abuse of
interrogatory discovery, id at 168(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983). Its applicability is now governed
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sanction's new applicability to failure to obey an order to submit to
96
or to produce another for medical examination is interesting.
Plaintiff's failure to comply with such an order in a personal injury
case has resulted, under the parallel federal rule, in an order deeming plaintiffs physical condition to be as claimed by defendant.' 97
The resulting detriment to plaintiffs case is obvious.
The outstanding feature of the established fact sanction is its
adaptability. An order under this subparagraph may be used to
neutralize an advantage the recalcitrant party might otherwise gain
from his obstinance. When a party's wrongful conduct operates to
make a fact unfairly difficult to prove, that fact may be held to be
established without proof. Thus, the punishment is made to fit the
crime. The order establishing facts has generally been used accordingly. 9 8 In fact, the United States Constitution may require a tailoring of the sanction decreed to the violation remedied.' 99 If the
established fact sanction is properly applied, its ultimate effect on
the lawsuit and the parties' rights is irrelevant. 2°
e.

Preclusion of Evidence

Subparagraph (2)(b)(4) authorizes the trial court to refuse the disobedient party the right to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses. Additionally, the court may prohibit the introduction of
specified evidence. This sanction existed before the 1984 amendments, but its availability has been broadened.2"'
Similar to an order deeming facts established, a preclusion order
ensures that a litigant does not profit from his own wrong.2 °2 If a
requested party unjustifiably retains evidence, and the requester is
by the general language of Rule 215(2)(b) so that the sanction may be used in response to
any discovery violation. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
196. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a.
197. Cf McMullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1960).
198. See English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 832 (1979); McMullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1960); Black v.
Sheritan Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974).
199. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxities de Guinee, - U.S. _
-

102 S. Ct. 2099, 2107-08,

__

L. Ed. 2d -

-

(1982).

200. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
_ 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2108,

__

L. Ed. 2d .

-

-

U.S. _

(1982); McMullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 278

F.2d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1960).
201. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170(b), 215a(b), 215a(c) (Vernon 1976); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(8)
(Vernon Supp. 1983).
202. United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 4, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:767

prejudiced by his resulting inability to study the evidence, the evidence should ordinarily be excluded. One Court has cautioned,
however, that:
[t]he right to present evidence . . . is so important that it should not
be denied unless the offering party has withheld relevant information
that he had a clear duty to produce, and even then the evidence
should not always be excluded if the rights of the opposing party can
be fully protected.2" 3
Such considerations have been the basis of the federal courts' insistence that evidence not be precluded if the requested litigant was
unable to provide discovery and the failure was not his fault. 2°
Nevertheless, when a preclusion sanction is clearly justified, the fact
that it ruins the sanctioned party's case does not render the order an
abuse of discretion.2 °5 Moreover, severe preclusion sanctions may
be resorted to as a deterent to future derelictions.2 °6
f. Extreme Sanctions
The majority of cases involving discovery sanctions concern the
sanctions authorized by Rule 215(2)(b)(5). This provision empowers the trial court to order a stay of proceedings, to strike pleadings,
to dismiss the plaintiff's case, or to render default judgment against
the defendant. These sanctions are termed the "ultimate" or "extreme" sanctions. It is settled that, consistent with due process considerations, ultimate sanctions cannot be imposed unless the failure
to make discovery is willful, in bad faith, or due to some fault of the
disobedient party. 2 7 The use of these orders to deter future abuses,
1980); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062,
1066 (2d Cir. 1979).
203. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State, 524 S.W.2d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
204. See United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369-70
(9th Cir. 1980); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (2d Cir. 1979); Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d
858, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1970).
205. See Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
206. See United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th
Cir. 1980).
207. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 212 (1958).
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however, is appropriate. 20

8

Rule 215(2)(b)(5) almost tracks the language of the former rules.
As with the sanctions of subparagraphs (2)(b)(3) and (2)(b)(4), subparagraph (2)(b)(5) sanctions are available to redress a wider range
of violations. 20 9 The only alteration of the extreme sanctions provision effected by the 1984 amendments resolves a split among the
Texas courts of appeals. Under the prior rule, it was not clear
whether dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction.210
The new rule clarifies that uncertainty by expressly providing for
dismissal with or without prejudice. This provision represents another incident of the broadening of the trial court's power to handle
discovery problems. Consequently, under new Rule 215(2)(b)(5) the
judge's decision to dismiss with prejudice will simply be measured
by the abuse of discretion standard.
Existing case law provides a measure of guidance as to when dismissal with prejudice, rather than dismissal without prejudice, is appropriate. After the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs cause of
action has run, dismissal with prejudice and dismissal without
prejudice are the same penalty. When the applicable limitations period has not expired, dismissal with prejudice is obviously a much
harsher penalty than dismissal without prejudice. It follows that
misconduct of greater gravity is required to justify dismissal with
prejudice.2 ' In many cases the gravity of the misconduct is a function of the plaintiffs culpability; the more culpable the plaintiff, the
more likely final dismissal is justified. A showing of actual bad
208. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976).
209. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170(c), 215a(b), 215a(c) (Vernon 1976); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(8)
(Vernon Supp. 1983).
210. The dispute is exemplified by the holdings of two 1979 court of civil appeals cases.
One case expresses the view that, as ordinarily understood, "dismissal" is not an adjudication of the parties' rights, but merely returns them to their status quo before the lawsuit.
Gonzalez v. Mann, 583 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'dper
curiam on other grounds,595 S.w.2d 102 (Tex. 1979). The court reasoned that since Rule
170 did not say "with prejudice," it meant without prejudice. See id. at 640. On the other
hand, the case of Bottinelli v. Robinson held that dismissal could be with prejudice, because
otherwise an imbalance in available relief for plaintiffs and defendants would exist. See
Bottinelli v. Robinson, 594 S.W.2d 112, 116-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979,
no writ).
211. See Phillips v. Vinson Supply Co., 582 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ) ("only the most aggravating of circumstances would
warrant a default judgment on the merits").
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faith, as opposed to a lower degree of fault, such as negligence, may
be necessary.21 2 The gravity of the plaintiffs abuse of discovery
may also be reflected in the resultant harm to the defendant. The
greater the defendant's harm, the greater the justification for dismissal with prejudice. For instance, if the plaintiffs actions have precluded the defendant from obtaining helpful evidence, dismissal
with prejudice may be necessary to protect the defendant.21 3 Other
circumstances may call for the harsh sanction of final dismissal; but,
in general, any time a trial court contemplates disposal of a lawsuit
on procedural grounds rather than on the merits it must exercise
caution.
Under the new rule, as under previous practice, certain orders
that appear to be authorized by the sanctions rule are not authorized. The law of default judgments proscribes certain actions by the
trial court even in invoking discovery sanctions. If the defendant's
answer is not stricken, the trial court cannot render default judgment on the pleadings either as to liability or to damages. In such a
case, the judgment is a post-answer default judgment, and the plaintiff must prove his case as to every element.2"4 If the answer is
stricken, the court may render a no-answer default judgment. But
even then, default judgment may not be rendered as to damages if
the alleged damages are unliquidated. In such a case the plaintiff,
upon hearing after notice to the defendant, must prove his loss. 2 IS
When the defendant's answer is stricken and the plaintiff seeks liquidated damages, the trial court has authority to render a final, dis212. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); Fultz v. Cummins Sales & Service, Inc., 587 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); cf Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) (gross negligence in failure to comply with disovery order
justified sanction equivalent in effect to dismissal with prejudice).
213. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). In Evans, the
discovery sanction involved was a default judgment rather than dismissal with prejudice.
See id at 519. Final dismissal of a plaintiffs case is the rough equivalent of rendition of
default judgment against a defendant. Thus, the same misbehavior that justifies default
judgment generally justifies dismissal with prejudice.
214. See Nutting v. National Homes Mfg. Co., 639 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
215. See Pearson Corp. v. Witchita Falls Boys Club Alumni Ass'n, Inc., 633 S.W.2d
684, 687 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849-50
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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positive default judgment as a discovery sanction.216
Orders imposing the sanctions of Rule 215(2)(b)(5) have been
measured against the abuse of discretion standard in a myriad of
cases in as many fact situations. An analysis of these holdings in
search for reliable or even helpful generalizations would be of dubious utility; it is certainly beyond the scope of this article. One discernible rule that has evolved, however, does merit special attention.
The new rule may well have undercut a tendency of the courts to
hold that the trial judge necessarily abuses his discretion when he
orders dismissal or default any time the sanctioned party has made
some effort to comply with the discovery requests. 7
This judicial tendency was elucidated in Young Cos. v. Bayou
Corp.2i" The court in Young Cos. noted that sanctions are to be
used to coerce compliance with discovery rules and not to punish
the noncomplying party.21 9 Thus, if the threat of sanctions eventually achieved compliance with the discovery request, the actual invocation of sanctions would be purposeless. The court held that
sanctions were unavailable against a party who ultimately made the
22
sought-after discovery. 1
The better view, however, was expressed in Southern Pac#ic
Transportation Co. v. Evans,22' which refuted the rationale of Young
Cos. The Evans court embraced a broader view of the function of
sanctions. The court recognized that sanctions should serve a deterrent purpose. Obviously, the potency of sanction rules as a deterrent to obstructive discovery practice is largely nullified if eleventhhour compliance will enable a party to escape sanctions. Accordingly, the eventual compliance argument was rejected, and the trial
court's decree was affirmed.2 2 2
If, as previously explained, the thrust of Rule 215 is to adopt a
216. See Reimer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 635 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
217. See Saldivar v. Facit-Addo, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 778, 778-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1981, no writ); Illinois Employers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 582 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam,590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1979); Young Cos. v.
Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901, 902-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
218. 545 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
219. See id at 903.
220. See id.at 902-03.
221. 590 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979), writ refd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 994 (1980).
222. See id at 518-19.
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new attitude about the office of sanctions, the eventual compliance
rationale cannot stand. This reasoning is grounded in an outmoded
notion of discovery sanctions. Modem litigation demands use of
sanctions to serve purposes beyond the mere ultimate achievement
of discovery. Consequently, eventual compliance with the rules is
only a factor for the trial court to weigh in devising an appropriate
order.
g.

Contempt of Court

Rule 215 (2)(b)(6) authorizes the court in which the action is
pending to punish disobedience of a discovery order as a contempt
of court. Unlike the sanctions of subparagraphs (2)(b)(l)-(5), the
contempt sanction is justified only by a violation of a court order.
Consequently, the breach of the discovery rules alone is not enough
to invoke a contempt citation.
The former rules provided for a citation for contempt to enforce
certain discovery orders. If a deponent refused to answer a question
after being so ordered, he could be held in contempt of court under
the old rules. 223 Failure to attend a deposition after being subpoenaed also enabled the court to punish the witness for contempt.224
The 1981 amendments granted the trial judge the power to treat
abuse of interrogatory discovery as contempt of court.225
Rule 215 (2)(b)(6) expands the applicability of a contempt citation
as a sanction for discovery impropriety. The court may hold a party
in contempt for violation of any discovery order except an order to
submit to physical or mental examination or to produce another for
examination. In this regard, medical examination orders are specifically exempted.226 A subpoena commanding a party to appear and
to be deposed should be considered a court order for purposes of
227
subparagraph (2)(b)(6).
From case law, one might conclude that the contempt citation has
not been a very popular discovery sanction in Texas. The lack of
discussion of the contempt citation in appellate cases, however, may
be explained by the sobering effect such an order usually has on the
223. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215a(b) (Vernon 1976).
224. See id 215a(c) (Vernon 1976).
225. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983).

226. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(6).
227. Cf Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1975).
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obstinate individual. The citation will ordinarily produce compliance with a court order. In fact, one Texas appellate court held that
a trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a case without first
trying to coerce compliance via a contempt order.22 8
Under contempt provisions similar to those of Rule 215, federal
courts have punished parties for both civil and criminal contempt.2 2 9
Criminal contempt has been reserved for more aggravated disobedience. 230 In deciding whether to treat conduct as either civil or criminal contempt, or as no contempt at all, the federal courts' focus has
been on the willfulness of the violator's wrongdoing.2 31
h.

Violation of Medical Examination Order

In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court added Rule 167a to our Rules
of Civil Procedure. Subdivision (a) of the rule reads:
(a) Order for Examination. When the mental or physical condition
(including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or
under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or
mental examination by a physician or to produce for examination the
person in his custody or legal control. The order may be made only
on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be
examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by
whom it is to be made.2 32
Rule 167a, unaltered by the 1984 amendments, does not provide a
sanction for failure to comply with an order issued under the rule.
The rules pertaining to discovery sanctions were not amended in
1973 to give the trial court a means to enforce its medical examination order.2 33 Thus, it appeared that the only remedy available was
228. See Texhoma Stores, Inc. v. American Central Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler), writ rejdn.r.e per curiam, 401 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1966) (disapproving this
reasoning because it was applied to proceedings at trial, whereas discovery sanctions are
only available pretrial).
229. See Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n., 602 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1979); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124-26 (5th Cir. 1968).
230. See Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 602 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1979).
23 1. See id. at 97; Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., I
F.R.D. 306, 307 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Roth v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31,
32 (W.D. Pa. 1948); Crosley Radio Corp. v. Hieb, 40 F. Supp. 261, 263 (S.D. Iowa 1941).
232. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a.
233. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170, 215a (Vernon 1976).
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a contempt order against the recalcitrant party. 3 A strained interpretation of Rule 167a might have allowed the court to exclude the
testimony of the refusing party's doctor.235 Moreover, one case held
that the trial judge must have power to stay proceedings until the
party complies with the order.236
This lack of an effective enforcement mechanism for medical examination orders is rectified by Rule 215. Subparagraph (2)(b)(7)
makes violation of an order to appear for or to produce another for
physical or mental examination punishable by the sanctions of subparagraphs (2)(b)(2)-(5). The party failing to comply will be excused if he shows that he is unable to appear or produce another for
examination.
Subparagraph (2)(b)(7) summarizes the sanctions available for violation of a Rule 167a(a) order. This provision performs two addi237
tional functions not otherwise dealt with in paragraph (2)(b).
First, since the contempt sanction is not listed as an authorized sanction in subparagraph (2)(b)(6), enforcement by contempt citation is
prohibited for an order to produce another for examination. Second, this provision excuses the inability to fulfill the requirements of
the order.
When the party ordered to appear or to produce another for examination claims that he could not comply, he has the burden to
prove his inability to comply with the order. The comment to the
rule's federal counterpart maintains that the party so ordered must
show that he cannot comply with the order in good faith. 23 This
modification seems reasonable, but it should not forbid the trial
court to punish a party for negligent non-compliance. 239 The party
should be required to apply his best efforts to satisfy the order.
Logically, the party ordered to submit to examination will only be
excused by an inability to appear caused by an unforeseeable
234. See Sales, Pre-Trial Discovery in Texas,31 Sw. L.J. 1017, 1037 (1978).
235. See id

236. Harrell v. Fashing, 562 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
237. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b). Subparagraph (2)(b)(7) is partly redundant of other
portions of paragraph (2)(b). By the terms of Rule 215(2)(b), the sanctions provided therein
apply to the violation of any Rule 167a(a) order. In addition, subparagraph (2)(b)(6) ex-

empts a party's failure to submit to a medical examination as ordered from punishment for
contempt.
238. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
239. Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 271, 294-96 (1968).
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change in circumstances that arose after the order was entered and
beyond the party's control. The requirements for showing the inability to produce another for examination are less stringent. First,
before the order is made the court must determine that the person to
be produced is in the legal custody or control of the party so ordered. Despite the existence of legal control, however, if the party is
practically unable to produce the other person, the non-compliance
should be forgiven. Of course, the trial court remains free to issue
another order to accomplish the needed examination.
i.

Expenses

Rule 215(2)(b)(8) authorizes an award of expenses as a sanction
for violation of any discovery order. This sanction is provided in
lieu of, or in addition to, any other imposed sanction. Thus, though
subparagraph (2)(b)(8) is not listed in subparagraph (2)(b)(7), an expense award is authorized for violation of an order to submit to or
to produce another for medical examination.
In essence, the expense award under subparagraph (2)(b)(8) is
similar to that provided by Rule 215(l)(d) against the unsuccessful
party on a motion to compel discovery. The general rule of subparagraph (2)(b)(8) mandates that the trial court require the noncomplying party to pay reasonable expenses caused by the noncompliance. The mandatory nature of the provision is intended to
encourage its use to deter litigants from persisting in their disobedience to the point where a sanction decree is necessary.24 °
The court should refrain from an award of expenses only where it
affirmatively finds that the disobedience was substantially justified
or that some other circumstance would make the award unjust. The
situations in which a party is substantially justified in violating a
discovery order are rare. The reluctant party had a chance to argue
the underlying discovery question when the order was entered and
lost the argument. His duty to provide or permit the requested discovery, therefore, is not before the court on a motion for sanctions
for violation of the discovery order. To show that his breach of the
order was justified, the party must satisfy the court that he reasonably believed that he had complied. If he is unable to show this, he
may try to prove that some other circumstances, such as his inability
240. See Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77 F.R.D. 750, 751 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
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to comply, makes an award of expenses unjust.24 '
This subparagraph permits the discovering party to recover his
expenses caused by his adversary's violation. The award encompasses more than merely the expenses incurred in obtaining the
sanction order. Any reasonable expense resulting from the delay
caused by the other party's obstinance or from the fact that the discovering party was deprived of needed information may be included
in the award. For example, if the discovering party is put to the
expense of uncovering the requested information in some other
manner, he is entitled to recover that expense. An expense award
under this rule may be against the recalcitrant party, his lawyer, or
both.242 The court may require that the expenses be paid at a fixed
date or adjudged as costs. In any event, an award of expenses is
reviewable only on appeal from the final judgment.243
3. Sanctions Against a Non-Party for Failure To Produce
In 1981, subdivision (4) was added to Rule 167.2 44 For the first
time, the rules provided a procedure whereby a party could obtain a
court order against a person not a party to the lawsuit directing him
to produce documents or things. 245 No sanction, however, was specifically designated to deal with the non-party's violation of the discovery order. The newly enacted version of Rule 167 retains
subdivision (4), and to correct the earlier omission, a sanction for
violation of Rule 167(4) order has been provided. Rule 215(2)(c)
now provides that a non-party who violates an order to produce
may be held in contempt of court.
C. Sanctionsfor Abuse of the Discovery Process.: Subdivision 3
When new Rule 215 was proposed to the Texas Supreme Court in
late 1982, the rule covered five pages and contained four subdivisions. Virtually the entire rule dealt with compelling discovery and
punishing refusal to make discovery. In recent years, however, the
court has recognized dangers to our system of justice arising from
241. Cf id
242. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(8).
243. But see Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir.
1982) (federal practice permits attorney to immediately appeal order charging expenses).
244. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(4) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
245. See id
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misuse and abuse of discovery which go beyond the refusal to permit discovery. 246 These concerns were verbalized last year by Justice Campbell as he wrote for the court: "Although this court has
extensively revised the discovery rules to expedite discovery, the revisions have not solved the abuse of the discovery process caused by
overly broad requests, delay in production, or production of material in a meaningless manner. "247
In an effort to arm Texas trial judges against abusive discovery
tactics, the supreme court engrafted a new subdivision (3) into Rule
215 which reads as follows:
3. Abuse of Discovery Process in Seeking, Making, or Resisting Discovery. If the court finds a party is abusing the discovery process in
seeking, making or resisting discovery or if the court finds that any
interrogatory or request for inspection or production is unreasonably
frivolous, oppressive, or harassing, or that a response or answer is unreasonably frivolous or made for purposes of delay, then the court in
which the action is pending may impose any sanction authorized by
paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) of paragraph 2b of this rule.
Such order of sanction shall be subject to review on appeal from the
final judgment.248
Clearly, this subdivision is susceptible of an interpretation that
subsumes the rest of the rule. Logically, all discovery conduct could
be categorized as either seeking, making, or resisting discovery.
Broadly read, then, Rule 215(3) makes the sanctions of subparagraphs (2)(b)(l)-(5) and (8) automatically available upon any discovery impropriety.
It is imperative that subdivision (3) be applied with its underlying
goal firmly in mind. This subdivision is intended to address serious
discovery problems not dealt with in the other provisions of Rule
215. Subdivision (3) should not ordinarily be resorted to when a
more specific provision of Rule 215 provides for the situation at
hand. Rule 215(3) is of greatest application to cases of abusive seek246. One step in the effort to meet these challenges was the promulgation in 1981 of
former Rules 167 and 168. Portions of these rules, Rules 167(3), 168(6), and 168(8), have
been blended to form new Rule 215(3). See generally Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw
with the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 460-66, 479-83 (1980) (discussion of
components of former rules). Because the idea of abusive discovery tactics was not introduced into the rules until 1981, the idea has not yet received authoritative construction.
247. General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1983).
248. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3).
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ing of discovery. The subdivision is of lesser importance when the
abuse is in the making of discovery and is least useful in dealing
with abusive resistance to discovery.
An award of expenses under paragraph (1)(d) against a movant
who unjustifiably seeks to compel discovery is the only sanction of
subdivisions (1) and (2) available against a party seeking discovery.
Any other complaint against the discovering party is subject to sanctions only if it is an abuse within the meaning of Rule 215(3). The
chief target of subdivision (3) seems to be the paper war, the technique of drowning an opponent in a sea of paper and expense. The
main weapon in this attack is the word processor, which spews out
voluminous discovery requests without regard to relevance or propriety. 49 This provision gives the trial judge the means to extricate
the litigation from this quagmire. The new sanction of disallowing
discovery is especially well-suited for ending the paper war.
The operation of Rule 215(3) will be less broad when a party
complains of an abuse in the making of discovery. For purposes of
249. See SCM Societa Commerciale S.D.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research
Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1976). In SCM Societa, Judge Porter, after recounting
twenty-three separate discovery events, complained:
The sad part of the foregoing chronology is that the only things accomplished in this
time span are the production of incomplete answers to Plaintiffs first set of interrogatories, the impregnation of my file cabinets, the generation of legal fees and the fact that I
have aged a year. Or is it ten?
The effect of these vexatious discovery tactics has been to substantially hamper the
speedy, just and efficient determination of legal disputes in the federal courts. These
kinds of practices cost litigants large amounts of money with the collateral effect of
tilting the scales of justice in the direction of the party that can best afford to pay.
This case makes abundantly clear that the supposedly self-executing federal discovery rules are being abused.
Id. at 112. Judge Porter specifically addressed the problem of the paper war:
This is often accomplished by use of what I consider an unprofessional and insulting
practice. I am talking about canned or form interrogatories. I have seen defendants
served with hundreds of irrelevant canned questions that have been cut and pasted
together by a paralegal or other staff assistant. In many cases the numbers were not
consecutive. If the plaintiffs lawyer is not willing to take the time to prepare questions
to fit his case the defendant and his attorney should not be compelled to answer them. I
do not mean that form questions areper se inappropriate. However, if used at all, the
form or canned questions must be used selectively, must be germane to the case, must
be prepared by a lawyer or under his direction, must be a reasonable number given the
nature of the case, and must be consecutively numbered. If I am convinced that a
lawyer has breached this standard or has in any way acted unreasonably I will deny the
discovery and/or impose sanctions.
Id at 113 n.5.
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a motion to compel discovery or for sanctions, an evasive or incomplete answer to a discovery request is equated with no answer at
all.250 When this provision enables the court to invoke the sanctions
of subdivisions (1) and (2) to deal with improper making of discovery, subdivision (3) has no application. The evasive answer proviso
of Rule 215(l)(c), however, is most easily applied to interrogatory
answers and may not be efficiently utilized when a response to a
request for production is challenged. Subdivision (3), on the other
hand, may be useful in deterring the tactic of deliberately disheveling documents before making production. A related practice is the
mixing of voluminous, irrelevant items with the appropriate,
sought-after documents. This technique is prohibited by the request
for production rule251 and is punishable by Rule 215(3).
The most restricted application of this subdivision is to redress
resistance to discovery since this subject is ordinarily the province of
subdivisions (1) and (2). In this context, subdivision (3) may serve
primarily as a catch-all provision which encompasses violations not
expressly mentioned elsewhere. For example, fairly read, Rules
215(l)(d) and (2)(b)(8) do not provide for an award of expenses
against a party who unjustifiably resists a motion for sanction when
no discovery order is yet in effect. Consequently, subdivision (3)
may be used to provide the trial court enough flexibility to award
expenses in this situation.
The remainder of this provision amplifies the broad language of
the first clause. Sanctions under subdivision (3) are available if an
interrogatory or request for production is unreasonably frivolous,
oppressive, or harassing. The dictionary defines "frivolous" as "of
little weight or importance" 252 and "oppressive" as "unreasonably
burdensome or severe. ' 25 3 Additionally, the definition of "harass"
is "to annoy persistently. ' 254 Thus, employment of interrogatories
and of requests for production deserves sanction if the queries concern entirely irrelevant matters, or if the relevance of the information sought is slight while the difficulty in ascertaining it is extreme,
or if the purpose is merely to annoy the opposing party. Similarly,
250. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(i)(c).
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(f).
252. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 461 (7th ed. 1975).

253. Id at 805.
254. Id at 522.
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sanctions are provided for answers or responses that are unreasonably frivolous or made for delay. Thus, providing voluminous
amounts of trivial information to obscure relevant items or to cause
delay justifies imposition of sanctions under Rule 215(3).
D.

Sanctionsfor Improper Failure To Admit.: Subdivision 4

Subdivision (4) of Rule 215 is a self-contained sanction provision
pertaining only to wrongful failure to admit the genuineness of a
document or the truth of a factual matter. This subdivision, in conjunction with Rule 169, forms a comprehensive procedural scheme
for requests for admissions and responses to them. These complimentary provisions must be applied to effect a system in which "the
litigants, their attorneys and the trial court. . . inan informal manner approach each other and seek by fair and open methods to find
the grounds upon which they differ, and those upon which they do
255
not differ.
Rules 169 and 215(4) evidence an intent to treat requests for admissions differently than other discovery. The remedies of Rule
215(4) are uniquely suited to effectuate the purpose of request for
admissions discovery. There is no reason to resort to other subdivisions of the sanctions rule to redress violations of Rule 169.
1. Failure To Respond Properly
Paragraph (4)(a) pertains to the respondent's failure to correctly
reply to requests for admissions. This sanction dictates that the matter inquired about is automatically admitted unless the respondent
prevents the admission by properly serving a timely and adequate
answer or objection to each matter asked about. 256 The subject matter of paragraph (4)(a) conforms to the amendments to Rule 169. In
fact, the first sentence of this paragraph is entirely redundant of the
255. See Masten v. Gower, 165 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, no

writ); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818,
825 (Tex. 1972); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 596 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, no writ); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Lee, 570 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), reh'g deniedper curiam, 584 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1979).
256. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818,

825-26 (Tex. 1972); Elkins v. Jones, 613 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no
writ); Trevino v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 613 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ).
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second paragraph of Rule 169.257 Paragraph (4)(a) appears in Rule
215 to provide a complete array of sanctions so that all consequences of failure to abide by Rule 169 may be found in the sanctions rule.
The final sentence of paragraph (4)(a) stipulates that an evasive or
incomplete answer may be treated as no answer at all. The result is
that the request so answered is deemed admitted. Although a new
provision, it only codifies existing practice.258
Rule 215(4)(b) permits the requesting party to secure a court ruling on the propriety of the respondent's objections or answers. If an
objection is challenged, the respondent bears the burden of justifying his objection. If he fails, the court is required to order that he
answer the request. If the movant attacks the sufficiency of an answer, the movant must prove that the answer does not satisfy the
requisites of Rule 169. If he succeeds, the court may either order
that the matter is admitted or that further answer be made.
Rule 215(4) makes an important distinction between two degrees
of deficient answers. The last sentence of paragraph (4)(a) states
that an evasive or incomplete answer is considered no answer at all.
Thus, the matter inquired about is automatically deemed admitted
without a court order. In contrast, paragraph (4)(b) stipulates that
if, upon motion by the requester, the court determines that an answer is defective under Rule 169, it may deem the query admitted or
it may grant the respondent a second chance to answer. Rule 169,
however, clearly demands that an answer be direct and complete.259

257. The provisions of the first sentence of Rule 215(4)(a) are covered in the discussion
of the parallel provisions of Rule 169 in Barrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting Discovery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 741-47 (1984).
258. See, e.g., Stewart v. Vaughn, 504 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 1974, no writ) (trial court may consider evasive answers to request for admissions as
admitted); Drake v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 393 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evasive answer deemed admitted).
259. Tex. R. Civ. P. 169. RULE 169 provides, in part:
The matter is admitted . . . unless . . . the party . . . serves . . . a written answer or
objection addressed to the matter . . . . The answer shall specifically deny the matter

or set forth in detail the reasons that the answering party cannot truthfully admit or
deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission,
and when good faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the
matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made
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Consequently, an evasive and incomplete answer by definition does
not satisfy Rule 169.
This evident overlap could generate confusion regarding the necessity of a motion and order before a request answered evasively or
incompletely is deemed admitted. The situation, however, is clarified by recognizing the distinction within the rule based on the severity of the defect. Logically, the inadequacy of the answer must
be so severe as to constitute a failure to answer before the requesting
party can safely ignore the response. Such treatment is appropriate
only for an obviously evasive or incomplete response.26 ° Similarly,
if the court, upon motion, determines that the deficiency of the answer is obvious, it should deem the matter admitted. If, however, it
appears that reasonable minds could differ regarding the sufficiency
of the challenged answer, the requester must seek a ruling on the
matter. If the court agrees with the requester, it should order the
answer amended. The cautious course for the requesting party is
always to move before trial to determine the propriety of the suspect
answer.
Rule 215(4)(b) concludes with an incorporation of Rule 215(l)(d).
The unsuccessful party on the motion to determine the sufficiency of
answers or objections will ordinarily be required to reimburse his
opponent for expenses incurred on the motion. To avoid the award,
the loser must convince the court that his position was substantially
justified or that other circumstances render the award unjust. All
other provisions of paragraph (1)(d) are equally applicable to the
award of expenses on a Rule 215(4)(b) motion.26 '
2.

Failure To Admit a Matter Proved at Trial

"The vital force behind the admissions procedure is its sanction
....*262 That sanction requires the party who improperly refuses
reasonable inquiry and that the information known or easily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny.
Id
260. The suggested construction comports with previous practice. See Stewart v.
Vaughn, 504 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); McPeak
v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 346 S.W.2d 138, 140-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no
writ).
261. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(4)(b).
262. Finman, The Requestfor Admissions in FederalCivil Procedure, 71 YALE L.J. 371,
426 (1962).
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to admit a matter to pay the expenses of proving it at trial.26 3 The
sanction for refusing to admit a matter not genuinely in dispute is
uniquely suited for its purpose. By requiring the refusing party to
bear the expense of proving the unadmitted truth, the rules at once
deter frivolous denial and make whole the innocent party.
The sanction rule for unjustified failure to admit has been substantially rewritten. From the original promulgation of the rules in
1940, until 1984, that sanction appeared in Rule 170 couched in its
original words.264 The updated version of the failure to admit sancRule 215(4)(c). That paragraph is identical to fedtion is found in265
37(c).
eral Rule
The revision has worked three significant improvements. First,
any failure to admit may trigger the sanction. The loophole that
formerly existed 266 when the responding litigant claimed without
warrant that he could not admit or deny is no longer available.
There was no valid reason for the distinction between a denial and
an answer refusing to admit. The sanction is meant to rectify any
untenable refusal to admit.267
Second, the burden of proof is shifted from the movant to the
non-admitting respondent. Under former Rule 170, the requesting
party had to show that his adversary had "arbitrarily refused to cooperate" in order to recover expenses.268 Now, once the requesting
party proves the truth of the denied matter, he need only move for
the paragraph (4)(c) award. It is the respondent's burden to show
that his failure is excusable.
Finally, the former "arbitrary refusal to co-operate" standard is
replaced with four more useful criteria. The respondent may avoid
the Rule 215(4)(c) sanction if the request is held objectionable. This
exemption, by its strict terms, is only applicable when the request
has been held objectionable by the court. If the requested party objects and the movant does not press the matter to a hearing, how263. The remedy of Rule 215(4)(c) provides for post-trial relief, and it must be re-

quested by motion to the trial court after trial. See Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
264. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 Historical Note (Vernon 1976).

265. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
266. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976).
267. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
268. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976); see also Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 425
S.W.2d 414, 419-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), afd, 436 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969).
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ever, the movant has acquiesced in the objection. This should
likewise foreclose a recovery of expenses.269 Clearly, the fact that a
request was objectionable does not preclude the award if the requested party never objects. 270 Another ground of excuse is that the

admission sought was not of substantial importance. This excuse
seems particularly useful to relieve a requested party from going to
significant inconvenience to learn the truth of a matter of little relevance to the litigation.
The third listed exemption from the expense sanction is the most
important. If the non-admitting litigant establishes that he had reasonable grounds to believe he would prevail on the issue at trial, his
failure is excused. Thus, Rule 215(4)(c) cannot be used as an end
run to place on the losing party the entire expense of the winner's
case. "[T]he true test under [Rule 215(4)(c)] is not whether a party
prevailed at trial but whether he acted reasonably in believing he
27
might prevail.

'

The respondent's last chance to escape the taxing of expenses
under paragraph (4)(c) is to show some other good reason for his
failure to admit. The idea behind requests for admissions is to eliminate from the lawsuit uncontroverted facts that are known or readily ascertainable by one side.272 This last exclusion may exempt the
requested party from liability for expenses when he could not reasonably have learned the truth of the matter asked about.273
E. Failure To Supplement Discovery Response: Subdivision 5

Rule 215(5) is the sanction complement to the duty to supplement
discovery in certain circumstances.274 The sanctions of this provision are specially tailored to provide a fitting redress of violations of
Rule 166b(5). The scheme established by these subdivisions is in269. See Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 271, 294 n.169 (1968).
270. See Cline v. Prowler Indus., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 984 (Del. 1980).
271. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
272. See Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Lee, 570 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978), writ refdper curiam,584 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1979).
273. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2290, at

805-06 (1970).
274. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(5); see alsoBarrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to
the Texas Rules of0Civil Procedure Affecting Discovery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 735 (1984).
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tended to frustrate any effort to unfairly surprise an opponent with
undisclosed evidence.
Both these new provisions are drawn from former Rule 168(7),275
which enunciated the duty to supplement now embodied in Rule
166b(5). The duty imposed under the former rule, however, extended only to interrogatory answers. Paragraph (a)(3) of former
Rule 168(7) provided sanctions for non-disclosure of an expert witness whose identity had been sought by a previous interrogatory.
Rule 166b(5) expands the duty to supplement by making the duty
applicable to all forms of discovery. Correspondingly, Rule 215(5)
expands the authorization of sanctions so that a sanction is available
for any breach of the broadened duty to supplement.
Subparagraph (5)(a)(1) of Rule 166b demands that the responding party provide to the discovering party new information that
shows the earlier response was incorrect. Subparagraph (5)(a)(2) directs supplementation when the respondent learns information that
renders the previous reply misleading. Rule 166b(5)(b) states a special duty to supplement a correctly requested list of experts expected
to testify at trial. The supplemental answer must identify the expert
and must set forth the substance of his anticipated testimony. Paragraph (5)(c) of Rule 166b stipulates that a duty to supplement may
arise from a court order, agreement of the parties, or a specific request for supplementation.276
Paragraph (5) sets forth two preclusionary sanction provisions
that address any violation of the duty to supplement. First, the violator is deprived of the right to introduce the evidence improperly
withheld. Second, for failure to disclose a newly discovered expert
witness or fact witness, the respondent loses the right to offer the
witness's testimony. These sanctions are mandatory. Of course, an
exception is provided to this otherwise rigorous rule. The trial court
may admit the evidence if it finds good cause sufficient to require its
admission.
The duty to supplement responses to interrogatories was first cre275. Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(7) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
276. Rule 166b(5)(c) and Rule 215(5) preserve the holding of Werner v. Miller, 579

S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1979). In Werner, one litigant attacked the trial judge's order setting a
time table and procedure for the disclosure of expert witnesses. The order warned that experts not designated in accordance with the order would not testify. The Texas Supreme
Court approved the order and the sanction for its violation. See Werner v. Miller, 579
S.W.2d 455, 455-57 (Tex. 1979).
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ated by the 1973 amendments to former Rule 168.277 At that time,
no sanction for breach of the new duty was included. Thus, it was
held that the trial judge had broad discretion to deal with any failure to amend answers.1 8 In 1981, a strongly-worded sanction was
added to the rule. That sanction rendered inadmissible the testi-

mony of an undisclosed expert witness. 9 In this particular, Rule
215(5) tracks former Rule 168(7)(a)(3).
This express sanction provision created in 1981 has not yet been
construed by the Supreme Court of Texas. The recent case of
Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,28° decided under the 1973 version
of the rules, may provide insight into the intended operation of the
new sanction rule. In rejecting the contention that the 1973 version
of Rule 168 required exclusion of an undisclosed expert's testimony,
the Texas Supreme Court reasoned:
We cannot endorse such an inflexible restriction on the trial court's
ability to fulfill its discretionary duties in conducting a fair trial and
administering discovery rules. To conclude that there was only one
permissible action available to the trial court is virtually to deny the
court any discretion in these instances. Smithson may have surprised
Cessna when she called an undisclosed expert witness but the record
does not clearly establish that the granting of a continuance or a postponement of the trial would not have sufficiently protected Cessna
from any harm due to the surprise. . . . Cessna, however, chose not
to request a continuance or postponement even after the trial court
refused to bar Baumann's testimony. Instead, Cessna asked only for
one of the harshest sanctions available to the court. The failure to
present a motion to continue or to postpone the trial severely undermines the assertion that the trial court abused its discretion. . . . We
hold that under these circumstances the exclusion of Baumann's testi" '
mony was not mandatory. 28
The approach taken in Smithson will not be appropriate under

277. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 168 Historical Note (Vernon 1976). Prior to 1973, one court
held that interrogatories were not continuing, and once answered there was no requirement
to supplement them. See Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mitchell, 423 S.W.2d 413, 417-18 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
278. See Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 229, 231-32 (Feb. 18,
1984); Allied Finance Co. v. Garza, 626 S.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
279. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
280. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 229 (Feb. 18, 1984).
281. Id at 232.
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Rule 215(5). Under the reasoning of Smithson, to reverse the trial
court's ruling to admit the resisted testimony, the appellate court
must find clear evidence that preclusion was the only available effective remedy. The court in Smithson noted that preclusion of the
testimony was not mandatory.282 Under Rule 215(5), however, preclusion is mandatory. To admit the testimony, the trial court must
affirmatively find the existence of good cause sufficient to require
admission. This approach places the burden on the offering party to
show that the evidence should be received. Further, the proponent
must convince the trial court that the justice of the case requires or
compels admission. The appellate court reviewing a ruling allowing
the testimony must examine the record for support for this finding
and if none exists, the trial court committed error.2" 3
One further observation must be made regarding subdivision (5).
The sanction of Rule 215(5) is imposable for the answering party's
failure to seasonably supplement his response when supplementation is required by Rule 166b(5). Supplementation is never seasonable if made less than thirty days before trial unless the court finds
good cause for permitting or requiring a later amendment. Whether
the additional response is seasonable, initially depends on how
much time has elapsed since the respondent first learned the new
information. The duty to disclose after-acquired information arises
when the information becomes known. Any lapse between then and
the time further response is made should be explained by the party
acquiring the information. The timeliness of the amendment is also
influenced by practical trial needs. If supplementation occurs at
282. See id at 232.
283. This analysis should be compared to the opinions of the courts of appeals in Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Webb, 660 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, writ refd n.r.e.),
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Lucas, 634 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ
granted), and National Surety Corp. v. Rushing, 628 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1981, no writ). The Lucas court adopted essentially the approach herein suggested. Texas

Indus., Inc. v. Lucas, 634 S.W.2d 748, 758 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ). On the
other hand, the courts in Webb and Rushing may have considered the trial judge's discretion
to be slightly broader, and appellate review to be slightly more relaxed. The opinions may
be read as requiring the party seeking preclusion to request in the alternative some less
drastic relief such as a continuance. But these conclusions cannot be drawn with certainty.
It appears that the record in Webbdid reflect good cause sufficient to require the expert's
testimony. The actual holding of Rushing is that the admission of the expert's testimony was

harmless. Therefore, neither Webb nor Rushing is really contrary to the analysis offered
herein. If any language of those cases is susceptible of a contrary reading it is submitted that
such a construction should be resisted.
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such a late date that the party receiving the new response does not
have a chance for full discovery, exclusion of the evidence may be
necessary.284
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Texas Supreme Court has promulgated new Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 215 in hope of providing a means to promote the
fair administration of justice. It can hardly be doubted that Rule
215 bestows upon Texas trial courts all the power needed to assume
that the discovery system operates efficiently. Rule 215 provides a
procedure for bringing a discovery dispute before the court for determination. The party who loses the argument will generally be
required to bear the expense of the hearing. In addition, the rule
vests the trial court with broad discretion to impose sanctions upon
either the party unjustifiably resisting discovery, or the party wrongfully seeking discovery. A special sanction provision complements
the requests for admissions rule to provide an easily administered
procedure for defining and restricting the issue to be tried. Finally,
meaningful protection is provided against surprise resulting from
failure to timely supplement discovery.
Nevertheless, more is required. The power vested in the trial
court must be used to effectuate the purposes of pretrial discovery.
The courts must resolve to employ discovery sanctions, not only to
obtain compliance with a particular order, but also to engender general respect for the discovery rules. In a small percentage of cases,
discovery sanctions may cause the decision to rest partially on some
basis other than the merits. It must be remembered, however, that a
litigant who avails himself of the court system to assert or defend his
rights and then flaunts its rules invites sanctions. If by the use of
discovery sanctions future litigants are deterred from abusive discovery practices, the objective of fair and expeditious adjudication
of substantive rights at minimum expense will be advanced. The
beneficiaries will be those litigants who voluntarily abide by the letter and spirit of the rules and the taxpayers who sponsor our system
of dispute settlement as well as the administration of justice itself.
284. Pope & McConnico, Practicing Law With the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L.
REV. 457, 480-81 (1980).
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V.

APPENDIX

Rule 215. Abuse of Discovery; Sanctions
1. Motion for Santions or Order Compelling Discovery. A party,
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all other persons affected thereby, may apply for sanctions or an order compelling discovery as follows:
a. Appropriate Court. On matters relating to a deposition, an
application for an order to a party may be made to the court in
which the action is pending, or to any district court in the district
when the deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a
deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken. As to all other discovery matters, an application for an order will be made to the court in which
the action is pending.
b. Motion.
(1) If a party or other deponent which is a corporation or
other entity fails to make a designation under Rules 200-2b, 201-4
or 208; or
(2) if a party, or other deponent, or a person designated to
testify on behalf of a party or other deponent fails:
(a) to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice; or
(b) to answer a question propounded or submitted
upon oral examination or upon written questions; or
(3) if a party fails:
(a) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 168, after proper service of the interrogatories; or
(b) to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule
168; or
(c) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 167, after proper service of the request;
or
(d) to respond that discovery will be permitted as requested or fails to permit discovery as requested in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 167; the discovering
party may move for an order compelling a designation, an appearance, an answer or answers, or inspection or production in accordance with the request, or apply to the court in which the action is
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pending for the imposition of any sanction authorized by paragraph
2b herein without the necessity of first having obtained a court order
compelling such discovery.
When taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of
the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he
applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make
such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on
a motion pursuant to Rule 166b.
c. Evasive or Incomplete Answer: For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to
answer.
d. Disposition of Motion to Compel: Award of Expenses. If
the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require a party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion
or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to
pay, at such time as ordered by the court, the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney
fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust. Such an order shall be subject to review on appeal
from the final judgment.
If the motion is denied, the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or attorney advising such motion to
pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney
fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
In determining the amount of reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, to be awarded in connection with a motion, the trial
court shall award expenses which are reasonable in relation to the
amount of work reasonably expended in obtaining an order compelling compliance or in opposing a motion which is denied.
e. Providing Person's Own Statement. If a party fails to comply with any person's written request for the person's own statement
as provided in paragraph 2(g) of Rule 166b, the person who made
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the request may move for an order compelling compliance with paragraph 2(g) of Rule 166b. If the motion is granted, the movant may
recover the expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, which are reasonable in relation to the amount of work
reasonably expended in obtaining the order.
2. Failure to Comply with Order or with Discovery Request.
a. Sanctions by Court in District Where Deposition is Taken.
If a deponent fails to appear or to be sworn or to answer a question
after being directed to do so by a district court in the district in
which the deposition is being taken the failure may be considered a
contempt of that court.
b. Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rules 200-2b, 201-4 or 208 to testify on behalf of a
party fails to comply with proper discovery requests or to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made
under paragraph 1 of this rule or Rule 167a, the court in which the
action is pending may, after notice and hearing, make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(1) An order disallowing any further discovery of any kind
or of a particular kind by the disobedient party;
(2) An order charging all or any portion of the expenses of
discovery or taxable court costs or both against the disobedient
party or the attorney advising him;
(3) An order that the matters regarding which the order
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of
the party obtaining the order;
(4) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him
from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(5) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing with
or without prejudice the action or proceedings or any part thereof,
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(6) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey
any orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination;
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(7) When a party has failed to comply with an order under
Rule 167a(a) requiring him to appear or produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5)
of this subdivision, unless the person failing to comply shows that he
is unable to appear or to produce such person for examination.
(8) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or
the attorney advising him, or both, to pay, at such time as ordered
by the court, the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Such an order shall be subject to review on appeal
from the final judgment.
c. Sanction Against Nonparty for Violation of Rule 167. If a
nonparty fails to comply with an order under Rule 167, the court
which made the order may treat the failure to obey as contempt of
court.
3. Abuse of Discovery Process in Seeking, Making, or Resisting
Discovery. If the court finds a party is abusing the discovery process
in seeking, making or resisting discovery or if the court finds that
any interrogatory or request for inspection or production is unreasonably frivolous, oppressive, or harassing, or that a response or answer is unreasonably frivolous or made for purposes of delay, then
the court in which the action is pending may impose any sanction
authorized by paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) of paragraph
2b of this rule. Such order of sanction shall be subject to review on
appeal from the final judgment.
4. Failure to Comply with Rule 169.
a. Deemed Admission. Each matter of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within the time provided by Rule 169, the party to whom the request is directed serves
upon the party requesting the admissions a sufficient written answer
or objection in compliance with the requirements of Rule 169, addressed to each matter of which an admission is requested. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer may be
treated as a failure to answer.
b. Motion. 'The party who has requested the admission may
move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order
that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer
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does not comply with the requirements of Rule 169, it may order
either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be
served. The provisions of paragraph d of subdivision 1 of this rule
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
c. Expenses on Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit the
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 169 and if the party requesting the admissions
thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of
the matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the
other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making
that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable
pursuant to Rule 169(1), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4)
there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
5. Failure to Make Supplementation of Discovery Response in
Compliance With Rule 166b. A party who fails to supplement seasonably his response to a request for discovery in accordance with
paragraph 5 of Rule 166b shall not be entitled to present evidence
which the party was under a duty to provide in a supplemental response or to offer the testimony of an expert witness or of any other
person having knowledge of discoverable matter when the information required by Rule 166b concerning the witness has not been disclosed, unless the trial court finds that good cause sufficient to
require admission exists.
This is a new rule effective April 1, 1984. Rule 170 is deleted
because this rule covers conduct in violation of Rule 167. The
revisions to Rule 168, the deletion of Rule 170, and the provisions of new rule 215 are intended to clarify under what circumstances the most severe sanctions authorized under the
rules are imposable. New Rule 215 retains the conclusion
reached in Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 590
S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1979), and extends such rule to cover all discovery requests, except requests for admissions. New Rule 215
leaves to the discretion of the court whether to impose sanctions with or without an order compelling discovery, so that
the court will be free to apply the proper sanction order based
upon the degree of the discovery abuse involved.
This rule is rewritten to gather all discovery sanctions into a
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single rule. It includes specific provisions concerning the consequences of failing to comply with Rule 169, and spells out
penalties imposable upon a party who fails to supplement discovery responses. It provides for sanctions for those who seek
to make discovery in an abusive manner.
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